(1/13) The power struggle within the State Dept. in fall 1996 had two factions: 1) the Afghan desk, under the South Asia Bureau run by Asst. Sec. Robin Raphel, whose members like Lee Coldren were not on board with the Admin's broader attempts to center women's rights as an
(2/13) important foreign policy issue & who wanted to engage with the new #Taliban regime in #Afghanistan due to other US interests in Central Asia; and 2) women's rights advocates in the State Dept., especially members of the Office of Global Women's Issues (#OIWI). The first
(3/13) group thought that women's rights concerns were not as important as "real" policy issues, & they were the ones who released the initial statements that seemed to indicate that the US was going to do business with the Taliban. Their reasons for wanting to engage with the
(4/13) new rulers in Kabul were many. 1) They wanted stability in Central Asia, & the Taliban seemed to promise and end to the many years of war in Afghanistan. 2) They thought that the Taliban would reduce Afghan opium production, thus helping US interests in reducing the
(5/13) global drug trade. 3) They were receiving Pakistan's advice, & Pakistan urged the US to engage with the Taliban (Pakistan had its own reasons for wanting the Taliban to rule Afghanistan & may have helped orchestrate the Taliban's rise to power). Ultimately, Pakistan was
(6/13) one of only 3 nations in the world that recognized the Taliban regime as a legitimate govt. (the other 2 were Saudi Arabia & UAE). 4) They hoped the Taliban could help the US locate a person of interest, Osama bin Laden. 5) But the most pressing reason some in State wanted
(7/13) to engage with the Taliban had to do with oil. A US oil company named Unocal had partnered with a Saudi company to propose an oil and natural gas pipeline to connect the oil & gas reserves of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, & Kazakhstan) to global markets. The
(8/13) proposed route took it across Afghanistan & into Pakistan. The project was supposed to enrich all who participated it - there was an estimated $4 tril. in oil & gas waited to be exploited. The pipeline, however, needed security for its construction, & the Taliban
(9/13) promised to provide that. Thus, Unocal spent approx. $2 mil. in 1996-97 alone to lobby the US govt. to support the pipeline, & it hired ex-US officials Robert Oakley and Zalmay Khalilzad to get the US public to see the Taliban positively. As early as 1995, the US did
(10/13) support the project. Pres. Clinton convinced the president of Turkmenistan to sign a contract with Unocal. Raphel announced official U.S. backing in early 1996 & held a long meeting with President Niyazov of Turkmenistan to move the pipeline forward. Meanwhile,
(11/13) declassified US docs indicate that the US embassy in Islamabad, which was the conduit for early US contacts with the Taliban, hosted functions on behalf of Unocal, & U.S. intelligence analysts briefed oil company reps. on Afghanistan. For all these reasons, Raphel &
(12/13) the Afghan desk sought to depict the Taliban positively in Sept. 96. This, however, was NOT at the direction of Sec. of State Warren Christopher, who had built a career as a human rights advocate & who supported the Clinton Admin's women's rights agenda. The other faction
(13/13) at State, led by the OIWI, quickly mobilized & tried to outmaneuver the pro-Taliban faction. After a short struggle, the women's rights advocates won. More on that - how the OIWI won the power struggle - in my next thread.
- KJS @TheGingerProf
- KJS @TheGingerProf
