These ventures use code to enable groups of people to act collectively to affect rights to #digital assets. We call these “decentralized ventures.” These decentralized ventures enable transactions among their participants in accordance w/rules created and enforced by their code;
human participants in these decentralized ventures interact with the venture, & sometimes with each other, using #smartcontracts. Smart contracts may break, or behave in unexpected ways. What happens when a smart contract defect /error harms a decentralized venture user?
That user might sue, seeking damages, to reverse the smart contract outcome, or to enjoin the venture’s ongoing operation. Litigation over smart contract outcomes may disrupt—if not destroy—decentralized ventures & may have negative effects upon the rights & property of others.
To avoid this problem, #decentralizedventures attempt to prevent users from suing by requiring that users defer to & agree to be bound to the outcome of smart contract execution. We call this “Code Deference"(s/o to @lex_node who AFAIK first used the term)
Code deference is critical to the orderly & predictable operation of #decentralizedventures; the article examines legal & technical attempts to impose code deference on users of certain types of #dapps and #daos including #theDao, and systems created by @lex_node and @awrigh01
It addresses strategies ranging from generalized obfuscation to on-system dispute resolution, to waivers & contractual covenants not to sue, to proposals not yet observed in practice. Many of them are very clever.
None, however, will always work. Absent significant legal reform, no approach based in code or in law can prevent a lawsuit over a #smartcontract outcome. This, however, is not cause for alarm; this is what reasonable minds should expect.
#Codedeference mechanisms can rebalance incentives by increasing the opportunity costs for a #decentralizedventure participant to sue over a smart contract outcome while providing efficient alternatives to litigation, and perhaps by providing better remedies within the venture.
Even with inherent limitations, well designd #codedeference provisions may functionally create code deference in all but a narrow set of circumstances.
Effective incentives toward #codedeference /resolution of claims within the system move users of decentralized ventures closer to the ideal of systems that allow parties to transact using rules created & enforced by code rather than rules created & enforced by a legal system./end
That user might sue, seeking damages, to reverse the smart contract outcome, or to enjoin the venture’s ongoing operation. Litigation over smart contract outcomes may disrupt—if not destroy—decentralized ventures & may have negative effects upon the rights & assets of others.
To avoid this problem, #decentralizedventures attempt to prevent users from suing by requiring that users defer to & agree to be bound to the outcome of smart contract execution. We call this “Code Deference" (s/o to @lex_node who AFAIK first used the term.)
without such an agreement, some may say, "let the code decide." While that's appealing, it also is not a real option; code provides abilities within system contexts, while law determines powers/rights. cc: @Andrea_Tosato & @Prof_CarlaReyes, see: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
It addresses strategies ranging from generalized obfuscation (i.e. #theDao) to on-system dispute resolution (the #metacartel DAO), to clever arrangements of rights & powers (#TheLao) waivers & contractual covenants not to sue, to proposals not yet observed. Many are very clever.
None, however, are iron clad. Absent significant legal reform, no approach based in code or in law can prevent a lawsuit over a #smartcontract outcome. This, however, is not cause for alarm.
#CodeDeference mechanisms can rebalance incentives by increasing the opportunity costs for a #decentralizedventure participant to sue over a smart contract outcome while providing efficient alternatives to litigation, & perhaps by providing better remedies within the venture.
Even with inherent limitations, well designed #codedeference provisions may functionally create code deference in all but a narrow set of circumstances.
Effective incentives toward #codedeference /resolution of claims within the system move users of decentralized ventures closer to the ideal of systems that allow parties to transact using rules created & enforced by code rather than rules created & enforced by a legal system./end
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We've got a new proposed #SEC#token#safeharbor that would let issuers offer tokens in the US. It's big. But, what's new? How is it different from the prior proposal? What's new? You guessed it. It's unavoidable, It's inevitable. It's a #THREAD. Let's dive in/1
Right off the top, we have the elimination of the "good faith" provision that was previously implied upon the issuers in a(1) & of a(4) which required the issuer to act in good faith to "create liquidity for users." /2
New section a(5) includes reference to the new "Exit report" which is a new requirment defined and explained further down but tldr; its a report issued by the issuer's counsel that asserts whether the tokens will be a security or not after the 3 year period. Good inclusion /3
3 most significant changes: mandatory semi-annual updates to the plan of development disclosure and a block explorer; exit report requirement with analysis by outside counsel explaining why the network is decentralized or functional, or an announcement that the tokens will
Is #FINCEN coming for #NFT#Art markets? A thread about the #NDAA, Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA), its expansion of BSA coverage to include “dealers in antiquities,” & what it might mean for the #crypto art world: (link to notice here: fincen.gov/sites/default/… ) /1
Why regulate transactions of antiquities (&maybe art)? The concern is that art & antiquities can be used for money laundering, to violate sanctions, & “have been linked to ...criminal networks, ...terrorism, & the persecution of individuals or groups on cultural grounds.” /2
On Jan. 1, 2021, Congress passed the NDAA, which expands existing anti-money laundering (AML) requirements on a variety of fronts, including the addition of “dealers in antiquities” to the definition of “financial institution.” /3
First, establish an government wide-policy. What do we want? Are we pro -innovation? Do want to protecting consumers? Do we want to strike a balance in the middle?Do we want to facilitate experimentation? How much control will the govt take over these experiments? /2
Do we want to make it easier or harder to launch businesses/reach consumers? To make an effective policy, we either need an interagency group, or a new freestanding group focused on the subject. Whoever tackles it, step 1, what do we want? /3
OFAC settlement w/@BitGo for apparently failing to prevent users accessing their online hot-wallet service via Crimea, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, & Syria IP addresses; service appears to be a non -custodial online wallet. Violaton of OFAC regs, NOT BSA . Let's look at the regs: /1
31 CFR 515.201, (i.e. Cuban Assets Control Regulations) prohibits transactions by foreign countries and their nationals including "...transfers, withdrawals, or exportations of, any property," /2
31 CFR 560.204 regarding Iran (defined as the Territority of Iran) also prohibits "exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, ....from the United States....of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran" /3