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Good overview here of the aid standoff that is brewing in Venezuela.
Both regime and opposition are trying to instrumentalize foreign aid for their own political advantage...so badly needed aid is not getting in.
So - what are the options?
Both regime and opposition are trying to instrumentalize foreign aid for their own political advantage...so badly needed aid is not getting in.
So - what are the options?
Historically, there are three basic approaches available: depoliticize and seek consent; confront and compel; or muddle through the middle.
*Depoliticize and seek consent* is the standard humanitarian approach. This would mean routing aid through neutral multilateral means (e.g. UN, Red Cross)...rather than flying it in on military planes and framing its intent as regime change.
This approach worked in Yemen in 2015. Saudis were seeking to blockade Iranian aid ships; Iran was using ships as a way to provoke Saudis. Neither much cared about the actual aid. UN stepped in as a neutral broker and US pushed both sides to allow aid in via UN.
Removed Saudis' rationale for blocking aid (b/c they couldn't characterize it as an Iranian plot) and removed Iran's rationale for using aid to provoke Saudis (because if UN could get aid through the blockade, no need for Iranian ships). reuters.com/article/us-ira…
(As an aside, this whole episode took up several weeks of my life, but we did at least prevent a Saudi-Iran military confrontation)
This sort of consent-based approach is sometimes referred to as a humanitarian corridor - both parties agree to allow aid through on neutral terms. It's generally the most viable way to get aid in at scale - but takes a lot of diplo legwork.
If you don't go that route, you can try confrontation - which is basically the path the US and Guaido are pursuing. This has a pretty checkered track record, even when the motives are truly humanitarian, rather than political.
What does this look like? Think Iraq/1991 or Somalia/1992-3. If you're facing an armed actor that's hostile to the aid effort, and you're not willing/able to negotiate depoliticized access, then you're looking at a militarized corridor.
This can get ugly fast. In Somalia, protecting the aid morphed into confronting the warlords morphed into Black Hawk Down. Iraq/1991 - Operation Provide Comfort - was more successful, but basically entailed US invasion and occupation of Northern Iraq (and long-term no-fly-zone).
There aren't many examples since early 90s because this isn't really something the world does any more. Partly because of Somalia hangover, and partly because a military invasion on behalf of an aid op would require UN authorization to be legal. And yeah...good luck with that.
The US and Guaido tactic in Venezuela is a variant of this - confronting the regime's obstruction directly, albeit without foreign military involvement (tho lots of US mil planes flying in the aid supplies).
There aren't many examples of this working, if a regime retains control of the borders and control of the security forces. It's a pretty high risk play, and most likely immediate outcome is that people get shot while little aid gets through.
Option three is muddle through - turn down the temperature, try to get aid in discreetly but without formal consent. This is largely what the US did for the first few years in Syria. Use a combination of consenting and non-consenting approaches to get aid in wherever feasible.
Bottom line here, from long humanitarian experience, is that a consent-based or muddle through approach is much likelier to get aid in at scale - if that's your actual goal.
If your goal is instead to provoke a political confrontation and overthrow the regime - OK - but then don't pretend that the motive here is humanitarian. Turning aid into a fig leaf for regime change is going to make legit aid much harder in many other countries.
Now would be a pretty good time for the UN to step in with a bold plan (think Operation Lifeline Sudan) for neutral aid distribution at scale.
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