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Kevin Williamson has responded to my thread about how segregationist Democrats of the 1960s and 1970s were roundly regarded as conservatives by just pretending that we were actually talking about the 1930s the whole time.
No, really. nationalreview.com/corner/new-dea…
No, really. nationalreview.com/corner/new-dea…
Here's the thread to which I think he's responding. See if you can find where I talk about the New Deal. I can't.
(For those of you who are as bad at dates as he is, the late 1960s and early 1970s were three decades *after* the New Deal of the 1930s.)
(For those of you who are as bad at dates as he is, the late 1960s and early 1970s were three decades *after* the New Deal of the 1930s.)
It reminds me of the old joke about the guy who drops his car keys in the park but looks for them on the sidewalk "because the light is better over there."
His column does nothing to address my points about the 1960s and 1970s, but I'll humor him and head to the 1930s.
His column does nothing to address my points about the 1960s and 1970s, but I'll humor him and head to the 1930s.
Now, the light *is* better over here, as Williamson surely knows, because historians agree that in the 1930s southern segregationists were key backers of the New Deal.
This is *sort* of a big theme in the prevailing literature on the New Deal. We talk about it a lot.
This is *sort* of a big theme in the prevailing literature on the New Deal. We talk about it a lot.
Williamson cites one of the most thorough takes on this topic, Ira Katznelson's terrific book Fear Itself, which won the Bancroft Prize.
He should probably also read Ira's previous book, When Affirmative Action Was White, but I *doubt* he'd like it that as much.
Anyway...
He should probably also read Ira's previous book, When Affirmative Action Was White, but I *doubt* he'd like it that as much.
Anyway...
After pretending I disagree with Ira's work, Williamson lays down this conclusion, in which he asserts that "the modern Republican-Democrat/conservative-progressive lines" had already taken shape in the New Deal era.
That, of course, is utter nonsense.
That, of course, is utter nonsense.
Contrary to Williamson's claims, the late 1930s witnessed the emergence of a strong conservative coalition in Congress, in which conservative Southern Democrats made common cause with conservative Northern Republicans to put a stop to the modern welfare state.
This is something historians have been writing about for more than a half-century.
One of the classic texts is Jim Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, which was published way back in 1967.
One of the classic texts is Jim Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, which was published way back in 1967.
That history shows pretty conclusively that Williamson's take is simply wrong -- the current lines of partisanship had *not* solidified in the 1930s.
Modern conservatism *was* taking form in opposition to the New Deal, but it was a thoroughly bipartisan effort in the 1930s.
Modern conservatism *was* taking form in opposition to the New Deal, but it was a thoroughly bipartisan effort in the 1930s.
In late 1937, senators from both parties issued the Conservative Manfiesto, a founding charter for modern conservatism.
It called for lower taxes and a balanced budget, a defense of states' rights and free enterprise, warnings about labor radicalism and welfare dependency, etc.
It called for lower taxes and a balanced budget, a defense of states' rights and free enterprise, warnings about labor radicalism and welfare dependency, etc.
As that article by Joe Alsop notes, the Conservative Manifesto was the brainchild of Senator Josiah Bailey, the conservative Democrat from North Carolina.
Again, historians have been talking about this for quite a long while.
Here's a @JourSouHist article from 1965:
Again, historians have been talking about this for quite a long while.
Here's a @JourSouHist article from 1965:
The drafters hoped to get 30-40 senators to sign it before releasing the document, but a leak to the press (above) scrambled their plans.
Still, conservative Southern Democrats had been deeply involved -- Bailey (NC), Byrd (VA), Glass & George (GA), Smith (SC), Tydings (MD).
Still, conservative Southern Democrats had been deeply involved -- Bailey (NC), Byrd (VA), Glass & George (GA), Smith (SC), Tydings (MD).
While the Manifesto set an agenda for modern conservatism in the long run, in the short term it brought the internal ideological conflict inside the Democratic Party to a head, with FDR's famous attempted "purge" of 1938.
That year, he targeted three of the Manifesto's backers.
That year, he targeted three of the Manifesto's backers.
The first was Senator Walter George (D-GA).
At one appearance, FDR noted -- with Sen. George on stage behind him -- that George was an ardent anti-New Dealer who "cannot possibly ... be classified as belonging to the liberal school of thought." FDR endorsed his challenger.
At one appearance, FDR noted -- with Sen. George on stage behind him -- that George was an ardent anti-New Dealer who "cannot possibly ... be classified as belonging to the liberal school of thought." FDR endorsed his challenger.
Then there was Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD), who -- as Susan Dunn notes in her terrific book Roosevelt's Purge -- had opposed virtually every aspect of the New Deal.
Third, Senator Ellison D. "Cotton Ed" Smith (D-SC).
Smith was economically conservative (insisting a family could subsist on 50 cents a day and didn't need minimum wages) and racially conservative too (storming out of the 1936 convention when a black minister offered a prayer)
Smith was economically conservative (insisting a family could subsist on 50 cents a day and didn't need minimum wages) and racially conservative too (storming out of the 1936 convention when a black minister offered a prayer)
In the end, none of FDR's challenges worked.
Indeed, they likely helped re-elect the three conservative Democrats, as they were able to campaign against FDR's carpetbagging.
Indeed, they likely helped re-elect the three conservative Democrats, as they were able to campaign against FDR's carpetbagging.
The Conservative Manifesto of 1937 and the failed purge of 1938 showed how stark the dividing line between the conservative southerners and the rest of the party was.
Asked if FDR hadn't proven to be his own worst enemy, Cotton Ed Smith retorted, "not as long as *I* am alive."
Asked if FDR hadn't proven to be his own worst enemy, Cotton Ed Smith retorted, "not as long as *I* am alive."
From 1938 on, the conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans from the Midwest and North effectively put an end to the liberalism of the New Deal.
After WWII, this conservative coalition only picked up steam:
After WWII, this conservative coalition only picked up steam:
So why didn't these conservatives formally switch parties?
Even though he has no evidence, Williamson takes a wild guess at it.
Even though he has no evidence, Williamson takes a wild guess at it.
But that's not right. As we've seen, they *didn't* believe in what the Democratic Party believed.
William F. Buckley, whom Williamson threw under the bus in that column, understood what they believed in -- power. And power came from their seniority in the majority party.
William F. Buckley, whom Williamson threw under the bus in that column, understood what they believed in -- power. And power came from their seniority in the majority party.
Without the special deal that former Dixiecrat presidential candidate and prominent southern conservative Strom Thurmond received from the Republicans -- a deal which allowed him to keep his seniority, and thus his power -- other Southern Democrats had no incentive to switch.
Indeed, they stated publicly that by staying in the Democratic Party, they would be able to stop its increasingly liberal agenda, because their seniority put them in key positions in Congress.
Here are Senators Lister Hill and John Sparkman of Alabama in the 1950s:
Here are Senators Lister Hill and John Sparkman of Alabama in the 1950s:
Likewise, because Senator Jim Eastland (D-MS stayed a Democrat, he became chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, where he killed all sorts of liberal legislation.
He said he had JFK's whole agenda "bottled up" and stuffed civil rights bills into a special pants pocket.
He said he had JFK's whole agenda "bottled up" and stuffed civil rights bills into a special pants pocket.
As you can see, the modern lines of progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans had *not* clearly formed in the 1930s and conservative Southerners stayed in the Democratic Party not because they liked its liberalism but because they thought it was the best way to stop it.
Again, historians have been chronicling all of this stuff for more than a half century, and Williamson should check it out.
But closer to home, he should also check out the National Review archives.
But closer to home, he should also check out the National Review archives.
