THREAD > Someone please prove me wrong. During today's CSIS conference on the ECS, SCS, and Pacific Islands I emerged as the clear contrarian on one point: I don't buy the argument that China's artificial islands are useless in a war or would be easy for US forces to neutralize.
First, they're enormous. As I recall @tshugart3 once pointed out, Mischief Reef is about the size of the 495 beltway around DC. Pearl Harbor Naval Base could fit in the lagoon at Subi Reef. That's a lot of ordinance to drop.
We also have to assume that a not insignificant number of missiles any adversary launched at the islands wouldn't make it through the various defenses. I believe @tshugart3 also once did a simulation to this effect based on US experience hitting Shayrat Airbase in Syria.
And as in that case, a strike would likely only disable the airstrips for a short time, unless, that is, you dropped A LOT of ordnance. So where's that ordnance coming from?
Well IF China is first mover in this hypothetical conflict it will presumably have already deployed combat aircraft to the airbases on the artificial islands. Barring a sudden rapid implementation of EDCA this means China will have air dominance.
The only ground-based US aircraft in the region will be 497th Combat Training Squadron in Singapore and a small number of patrol aircraft in Malaysia & PH. Combat aircraft are 1300nm away in Okinawa or 1500nm away in Guam.
If the US happens to have a carrier in the SCS when hostilities erupt, it'll be well within the range of ballistic missiles from the mainland as missiles from the islands (& Chinese subs?). 1st priority will be steaming east as fast as possible all the way to the Philippine Sea
In the face of both the missile threat and Chinese air dominance, every other US Navy ship will likely be heading east too as fast as possible. So that only leaves US submarines in the theater.
US subs could probably continue to operate without detection. But that'll be a lot harder if they start shooting. And if they're going to do that, Chinese surface ships are much more valuable and viable targets than trying to blanket a DC-sized Air Base at Mischief Reef.
Subs launching an attack on the bases would have to do so at risk of exposure to Chinese ASW capabilities (e.g. ships/subs as well as the ASW helibase at Duncan Island if they're trying to hit Woody Island in Paracels too).
So that leaves long-range bombers from Guam. But that would be putting very high value assets at risk in a secondary theater. Secondary because I can't imagine a scenario in which the US would drop bombs on bases in the Spratlys that wouldn't also mean a war in Northeast Asia.
So in that conflict where does neutralizing the Spratlys fall in the order of US priorities? Far below defense of Japan and US forces there, as well as potentially Taiwan depending on the scenario.
So yes, the US technically has the capability to neutralize Chinese bases in the Spratlys. And given logistical and maintenance problems China likely can't operate combat aircraft from the islands for very long.
But for the opening stages of any hypothetical conflict, based on current US posture in the region, the islands give China air dominance, help force US surface ships out of the SCS, and could only be neutralized at a cost US couldn't afford given needs in Northeast Asia.
This could of course be changed with a rapid and full implementation of EDCA, allowing US rotational combat aircraft in PH, combined with positioning US missiles/artillery in PH to hold Chinese islands and ships at risk. But no signs of that happening yet (or under Duterte)
All of that said, I'm neither a war planner nor a naval operator. So what am I missing?
