, 20 tweets, 3 min read
My Authors
Read all threads
After the Berlin conference on Libya, it is time for a broader assessment where European foreign policy stands, with regards to Europe's neighborhood. A few (not very uplifting) thoughts. /1
The fundamental change taking place in the last years is the departure of the US as a strategic leader. The US remains present however as a military power mainly through Nato, and it keeps on playing a big role in the Middle East. /2
But the times when the US provided Europe with a strategy (such as "Europe whole and free") and had an answer to every challenge, the times when Europeans just needed to figure out whether they were fully, half or not on board — these times are are over. /3
Now Europeans have to figure out themselves what's going on, and find out what they want to do. Either together — as coalition of European powers — or alone. /4
What they are increasingly faced with in their eastern and southern neighborhood is a revisionist power that considers itself a competitor to the US, and is eager to fill the vacuum emerging from partial US departure: authoritarian Russia, ambitious and ruthless. /5
That Russia wants to shape its neighborhood is nothing new. Yet in the last decades the Russian focus was on Eastern Europe, where Russia was using all kinds of instruments, including military force, to regain a dominant position, to build spheres of control. /6
Since a few years however the challenges in the "eastern neighborhood" and in the "southern neighborhood" have increasingly merged. The Russian military intervention in Syria in 2014 was a major turning point. /7
In the last months we saw another turning point. Europe's failure to produce in Libya — after a French- and UK-led military intervention in 2011 —, anything remotely looking like stability opened the path for a civil war with two competing factions. /8
This civil war turned the country into an open space in which ambitious regional players could compete for influence by backing one of the parties. This opened the path for Russia to enter, after Syria, into Libya as a second key theatre in its bid for regional leadership. /9
The new arc of crisis and conflict is increasingly unsettling EU-Europe. Without US strategic leadership, there is a sense in larger European capitals that they have a bigger role to play themselves — especially in Paris and Berlin. /10
Both have tried to carve out new roles recently. France wants to partner with Russia. That's why Macron has tried to resolve the Ukraine conflict. Yet the Ukraine meeting in Paris was just confirming the status quo — nothing that would legitimise a broad reset with Russia. /11
Meanwhile Germany has decided to try something on Libya, with the Berlin conference. Yet again, this conference was just confirming the status quo, no player has moved so far. /12
In both cases, Paris and Berlin pretended to be on the same page, for the optics, yet there were deep divisions: different views of the problem, different definition of interests — and no will to bridge those differences as both sense they are right. /13
As a consequence of this split, there is little "Europe" present in the arc of crisis and conflict around Europe. Russia has a free hand. And even if it disagrees with Turkey about strategies in Syria and Libya — both are united in their desire to sideline Europeans. /14
There is no game changer in sight. German-French divisions are substantial: Germany is "liberal", France is "realist"; Germany wants the US to stay, France much less so; Germany is nervous about Russia, France isn't; France is worried about terrorism, Germany about migration. /15
In the past, this kind of division in Europe has been bridged by the US, which through its special relations with every European country was able to produce some degree of geopolitical unity, leading to joint responses to major foreign policy challenges. /16
Today we see that Europeans have a very hard time producing agreement on geopolitical challenges. There is nobody in Europe who can impose anything, no hegemon or powerful leader. We see broadly equal players competing behind a facade of unity. /17
The main beneficiary of this is Russia, which can easily expand its influence in the arc of crisis and conflict spanning from Belarus to Libya. Europeans are largely bystanders, not key actors in these regions. /18
As a consequence, the model of order strengthened in the region is not liberal democracy or at least some degree of participation, and market economy. It is authoritarian government and dictatorship — part of Putin's crusade to make the world safe for autocracy. /19
How to counter these trends? Europeans should rethink foreign policy cooperation, especially coordination among European capitals. They should bring the US in whenever possible. And stick to their core interest which is long-term stability via (some degree of) liberal order. /20
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh.

Enjoying this thread?

Keep Current with Ulrich Speck

Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

Twitter may remove this content at anytime, convert it as a PDF, save and print for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video

1) Follow Thread Reader App on Twitter so you can easily mention us!

2) Go to a Twitter thread (series of Tweets by the same owner) and mention us with a keyword "unroll" @threadreaderapp unroll

You can practice here first or read more on our help page!

Follow Us on Twitter!

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just three indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3.00/month or $30.00/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!