The US can shape and influence the coming intra-Afghan negotiations. What are our tools:
a. Withdrawal. The agreed 2021 timeline takes us into a new President or a Trump not facing election. The Taliban have seen our schedules come and go; they know we can change our minds.
a. Withdrawal. The agreed 2021 timeline takes us into a new President or a Trump not facing election. The Taliban have seen our schedules come and go; they know we can change our minds.
2/ b. Future military assistance. Basically, the Government of Afghanistan has a year to demonstrate that it can be a credible military force with US assistance but not troops. If they are, they are in a stronger position to deal.
3/ b. Legitimacy. The apparent Taliban focus in these negotiations on symbols (like the unwieldy title) and largely symbols sanction demonstrate that they perceive a cost to being an international pariah and recognize us as a key gatekeeper.
4/ c. Financial assistance. No modern Afghan government has sustained itself on domestic resources. Every Afghan in the coming negotiations will know that they will need international — really, US — support to maintain whatever governing arrangements emerge.
5/ d. Influence over our partners. As the recent election crisis reminds everyone, the US has a unique ability to help the Afghan participants in the Bonn order to cooperate. That will be needed, and tested.
6. So, how do we use this his leverage? What do we need?
7/ a. We need Afghanistan to police it’s own territorial against internationally focused terrorist groups. That’s the real motivation of our war and of the Taliban agreement. It’s the sine qua non.
8/ b. A return to full-scale civil war is deeply contrary to our interests (and, obviously, to Afghans’ own). AQ was invited to Afghanistan to provide support in a civil war. Another civil war will create opportunities for terrorists. Stability is important to us.
9/ c. We care about Afghanistan’s governing arrangements, and especially women’s, minority, and human rights. No, that hasn’t been the driver behind our war. And no, we do not have the ability on our own secure good government and human rights for Afghans. But we can help.
10/ d. We care about representation in the negotiations, especially of women. This is sui generis-ly important, and based on comparative research, negotiations including women are more like to succeed.
11/ Getting this right will be both strategically and tactically difficult. But there is a chance. To seize it, we cannot repeat our classic mistake of failing to prioritize and we cannot give into fatalism.
