Thread by @AndrewSErickson

Honored to be cited by @iandenisjohnson @NewYorker:
newyorker.com/news/persons-o…

"Andrew Erickson, a professor @NavalWarCollege & a visiting professor at @Harvard, said he’s seen no evidence that #China..."

For further background, see: sites.harvard.edu/coexistence/
thewirechina.com/2022/12/04/fix…

...wants to reciprocate, citing #China’s refusal to discuss meaningful arms control. “I don’t see a basis for deep coöperation” with #Xi’s China, Erickson said. “I’m sad to say that.”

newyorker.com/news/persons-o…

KEY: In what areas is the #PRC under Xi willing to accommodate the US?

•To make the first move in doing so?
•Can anyone name one specific example?

Moreover, in the #PRC under #Xi, is there anything like an equivalent to this high-profile conference @Harvard, w a concluding panel on the subject of “Toward Coexistence 2.0: What Should #CHINA Do?”

•With mainstream establishment foreign participation?
•That is open to the public, both in person & virtually?
•That is on the record?

For these & related points, watch @Harvard US-#China conference @YouTube:



That cuts to the heart of the issue...

And now for some points from my notes that I didn't have time to offer @Harvard #China conference:

Unfortunately, #climate is not the basis/oasis for cooperation that some hope. Instead of pursuing genuine cooperation, the #PRC under #Xi treats climate as a bargaining chip.

Beijing’s decision to halt #climate talks in the wake of Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to #Taiwan reveals climate to be substantially lower in PRC’s hierarchy of political needs than #China under #Xi believes it is in Washington’s.

Xi & the Party he leads ALWAYS come first.

#PRC under #Xi won’t give up #coal. In fact, when #China sources #energy, it favors coal.

*China consumed an amount of coal in 2021 that exceeded Europe’s ENTIRE energy consumption from ALL sources.

“New engagers”/“competitive coexisters” must address these inconvenient truths.

To support its power plants & boilers, #China under #Xi now produces ~370 million tonnes of raw #coal each month—the mass of ~1,000 Empire State Buildings!

Stubborn facts: Regardless of what the #PRC says, it keeps leveraging its abundant, reliable & cheap domestic coal supply.

#China #Coal Industry Association reveals:

#PRC coal production & sales have both increased since November. Example—Inner Mongolia's Ordos municipality: +46 new coal #mines entering production, +95.7 million tons of annual output.

chinascope.org/archives/31230
tech.huanqiu.com/article/4AlwVD…

•Because of its huge installed base of long-life assets, w/o building a single gigawatt of additional #coal-fired generation capacity, #China could greatly increase consumption.
•#Xi didn’t even bother to attend #COP27.

> Time for #ClimateCompetition: bakerinstitute.org/research/china…

Now back to the big picture debate re US #China policy:

"#ZhaDaojiong..immediately challeng[ed] the conference’s framing: 'I am a little concerned about what you mean by #coexistence,' he said, arguing it harkened back to the #ColdWar w/the #SovietUnion."
thewirechina.com/2022/12/04/fix…

Together with periodic #PRC denunciations of a US "#ColdWar mentality," this gets to some fundamental contradictions.

As I always say, if the US & #China had a "late Cold War mentality," then they'd at least be engaging in robust, binding #ArmsControl negotiations & limitations!

Take #INFTreaty,for ex.

Despite extreme US/#Russian rollback/restraint,#PRC built world's foremost conventional ballistic missile force w/in precisely #Treaty's parameters but refused to enter discussions—let alone join.

#Xi/PRC won't accept restraints.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…

Despite having >400 op #nuclear warheads already & expanding @ rate projected to reach 1,000 by 2030—most deployed on systems capable of ranging continental US—& would reach 1,500 by 2035, #Xi/PRC refuses to acknowledge #nuke buildup, let alone engage in #ArmsControl discussions.

So, a major dilemma that "new engagers"/"competitive coexisters" face—even empowered interlocutors like #ZhaDaojiong won't even embrace the term "#coexistence."

US-#China chasm under #Xi is simply too vast to bridge in any robust manner—even in rhetoric.

thewirechina.com/2022/12/04/fix…

"It’s the last group, the 'competitive coexisters,' from which Weiss & the new thinking stem. McCourt told me that he originally wanted to call them the 'new engagers,' but members begged him not to, so tarnished is the word '#engagement' in Washington."

newyorker.com/news/persons-o…

I think all this merits deep reflection/discussion. I'd never want myself or my son to live in a country where the government dictated what policy slogans meant & suffocated debate.

But words do matter.

So—in that spirit—here's some food for thought on "#CompetitiveCoexistence"

In January 2019, I attempted to outline a "#CompetitiveCoexistence" concept @TheNatlInterest: nationalinterest.org/feature/compet…

I'll be the first to admit that MUCH has changed in nearly 4 yrs under Xi.

Now I recommend "#HoldingTheLine" thru this #DecadeOfDanger:

bakerinstitute.org/research/us-ch…

I try to reread my work periodically to see how it's holding up. Sometimes it's sobering. But I think it always helps me do better than I otherwise would.

Revisiting this keeps bringing me back to #Reciprocity as minimal basis for #CompetitiveCoexistence:
nationalinterest.org/feature/compet…

#CompetitiveCoexistence ideas:
Don’t suppress PRC wholesale, oppose harmful behaviors.
Accept risk/friction to recalibrate PRC actions threatening US interests.
Hold ground in contested areas to thwart PRC dominance.
Reduce tensions/pursue shared interests as much as PRC willing.

"Reduce tensions/pursue shared interests as much as PRC willing."
That's min. basis for #CompetitiveCoexistence IMHO.
One side can't be disproportionately expected to make 1st move: real experience buying a car or negotiating int'l relations shows that doesn't work. Reciprocity!

As I've argued in this #Thread—whether in #ArmsControl or #Climate—#Xi's demonstrated he won't embrace credible #reciprocity. Worse, he won't honor prior agreements—#HongKong/#Ukraine, etc. So IMHO, approach advocated here isn't "#CompetitiveCoexistence."

newyorker.com/news/persons-o…

In the end, it matters little how I attempted to frame a concept nearly 4 years ago.

What matters is the reality ANY US-#PRC #policy rec's must address.

One in which #China abandons treaties/agreements & halts talks—& even someone like #ZhaDaojiong won't embrace "#coexistence."

#Update: This discussion is too important not to continue, so I’m at it again.

A full consideration of US #PRC #policy to date & potential future directions must recognize all the #engagement US actually tried & the results—particularly how #China failed to meet its obligations.

The US engaged for 40+ years & bent over backwards to promote & accommodate a cooperative relationship.

Washington has pursued deep, deep #engagement & yet Beijing never met its commitments re. the vast majority of it.

Let’s review attempts to engage earlier in #Xi’s tenure...

The #Obama-#Xi Statement + S&ED readouts offer concrete evidence that the US truly did engage—across a wide range of issues—but #PRC proved not to be serious...

Some real US engagement:
2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/20…
home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…

How much of this did #China ever live up to?

Pls. review the Remarks by President #Obama & President #Xi of the People's Republic of #China in Joint Press Conference—particularly the highlighted excerpts attached.

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-offi…

How well has this aged?

To what extent has Xi honored the commitments he made here?

#Xi personally committed to #Obama to not #militarize key #SouthChinaSea areas & to not commit #cyber #IP theft—commitments at highest level that he failed to honor.

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-offi…

See attached highlighted text.

Now we know #SCS violation was ongoing even as Xi spoke.

#Xi committed to #Obama to uphold #nuclear nonproliferation regimes & implement/enforce #UNSCRs—reneged despite PRC's @UN emphasis.

How it started (key text attached):
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-offi…
How it's going:
isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
reuters.com/article/us-nor…
amp.cnn.com/cnn/2022/05/26…

This US-#China agreement on Combating #Illegal, Unreported & Unregulated (#IUU) #Fishing is truly a sad relic from a bygone era.

2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/20…

Then as now, #PRC = world's #1 source of IUU fishing.

US isn't even a "small fry" violation source.

uscg.mil/Portals/0/Imag…

#China's failure to honor its commitments isn't just in #military/#security areas—it's across the board.

#PRC likewise reneged on #ExchangeRate liberalization commitment at S&ED:

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…

As for "Leveling the Playing Field & Supporting Fair Competition"...(!!!!)

Sadly, hard to see how this one passed the sniff/giggle test even way back then: "#China affirmed that it does not condone any #trade #secret #theft for #commercial advantage..."

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…

Raise your hand if you ever believed this was credible in the first place:)

And then there's "Enhanced US-#China #Cooperation on #IntellectualProperty & Rule of #Law"

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…

How's that one worked out in practice? Please tell me :)

[Such are the extreme lengths the US went in "#engagement." Nobody can (reasonably) say we didn't try...]

How could there be true US-#China engagement without "Improving Economic Transparency"?

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…

And yet, I ask: How's that #PRC promise under #Xi played out in practice over the last 6+ years?

(This's not even #military transparency we're talking about here...)

"Promoting An Open, Predictable, & Transparent Climate for US Firms & Innovation"—I'd support that, too!

...But I challenge anyone to make the case that that's what #Xi/the #PRC's actually done in practice in the 6+ years since they made this commitment!

home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…