Thread by @HannaNotte

Last yr #UkraineWar became the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy

➡️7 trends
1 Full turn to non-West
2 China’s junior partner
3 Less leverage vis middle powers
4 Struggle in the neighbourhood
5 Russia MFA sidelined
6 Wagner normalized
7 End of compartmentalization
🧵

1. Full turn to the non-West:
Judging its break with the West to be total & irreversible, Russia's leadership has intensified its (pre-existing) turn to #MENA, #Africa, #LATAM, #Asia-Pacific.

Shunned & sanctioned, Russia needs to make up for losses wherever it can... (2/22)

This year, Lavrov already visited 8 African states, Iraq, & hosted Pakistani & Egyptian FMs.

Russia's push to expand engagement does resonate.
Last spring, #MENA states for instance refused to take the West’s side vs Russia - for complex reasons: docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA… (3/22)

I don't think much has changed one year on

I spent last week–when Western officials at #MSC lobbied to get Global South onboard–in meetings w/ppl from across those regions & the clash in views is still striking: Most don’t see the war as a defining moment for global order (4/22)

2. China’s junior partner:
Per @AlexGabuev (et al), #UkraineWar has pushed the asymmetry in #Russia-#China relations to new levels. China has become Russia’s main trading partner - on beneficial terms for Beijing, giving it unprecedented leverage:

https://twitter.com/alexgabuev/status/1557065797499080704?lang=en

(5/22)

At #MSC, Chinese FM Wang promised PRC would introduce a peace plan for Russia and Ukraine, which would also oppose use of any WMD:

https://twitter.com/Cox_NukePol/status/1626891100886601728

It remains to be seen whether Beijing is willing to truly exercise leverage over Moscow. (6/22)

3. Less leverage vis-a-vis key middle powers:

The most consequential examples of this are #Iran & #Turkey, though there may me others. As a result of the Ukraine war, Moscow has fewer levers today over Ankara and Tehran than it did 1 year ago. (7/22)

#Turkey is a net winner.
It has gained enhanced room to maneuver in #MENA/South Caucasus. Economic leverage in the Russia-Turkey relationship has somewhat shifted to Ankara's benefit. And Turkey is indispensable to the #West as go-between w/Russia: nonproliferation.org/wp-content/upl… (8/22)

#Tehran has gained cards vis Russia given the latter's need for drones.
#UkraineWar also reduced Russia’s leverage over #Iran in the context of the #JCPOA, as I argued in @WarOnTheRocks recently.
This is no longer a patron-client relationship.
warontherocks.com/2022/11/dont-e… (9/22)

The ripple effects of enhanced #Iranian/#Turkish self-confidence vis #Russia may be felt (if not already manifest) in many areas:
Power dynamics in Syria and the South Caucasus; #Iran’s defense industry; Russia-#Israel relations; Turkey’s bargaining with #NATO. (10/22)

4. Struggling in the neighbourhood:

Distracted by Ukraine, #Russia now has limited bandwidth to deal with renewed tensions in the South Caucasus, guarantee local peace, be a security partner to #Armenia. (11/22)

The result to date: Baku emboldened & Yerevan disillusioned.
As an excellent recent @crisisgroup report argued, renewed war is a real possibility in 2023, crisisgroup.org/europe-central… (12/22)

Russian distraction has also emboldened actors in Central Asia. Look at Kyrgyz-Tajik hostilities last Sept, or Kyrgyzstan cancelling CSTO exercises.
Russian trade w/the region is still strong, but its soft power is dissipating, says @TUmarov: carnegieendowment.org/politika/88698 (13/22)

5. #Russia‘s MFA sidelined:
War against Ukraine has turned Russia’s diplomats into executioners of policy that's entirely decided elsewhere. Yes, the MFA was already sidelined in years prior on certain dossiers (eg Syria after 2015) but the trend has intensified... (14/22)

..There’s indication the MFA was not involved in the decision/planning for #UkraineWar: foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/11/us-…

Or take the cancellation of the #NewSTART Bilat. Consultative Commission- apparently decided last min. in the Kremlin though the MFA seemed prepared to engage (15/22)

Or recent talks on a safe zone in #Zaporizhzhia - conducted by RUS diplomats, then the military inserted itself:
reuters.com/world/europe/d…

RUS diplomats also seemed to engage in multilat. diplomacy – like the NPT RevCon last year – with little guidance/mandate from Moscow (16/22)

6. Wagner normalized
Russian PMCs, chiefly Wagner, have long operated in Syria, Libya, Mali, CAR, Sudan etc. But in light of their crucial role in offensive ops in #Ukraine, they’ve recruited in much higher numbers, esp among convicts, and gained greater purchase (17/22)

So far, it appears that #Wagner –despite high casualties in #Ukraine –retains bandwidth for a solid presence in these other theatres and allegedly even becomes active in new places like #Serbia.

But most noteworthy is the normalization of Wagner in Russia’s public space: (18/22)

State media report about it often
Prigozhin more visible than ever
Wagner HQ opened in St Pete
Pol actors calling for its legalization & social security for its mercenaries.

This is new & accompanied by what appears to be a nascent proliferation of RUS private armies. (19/22)

7. The end of compartmentalization:
Finally, as I argue in a piece out soon @WoTR, Russia has stopped compartmentalizing almost all issues from tensions with the #West.

This is most evident in its decision today to suspend implementation of the #NewSTART treaty. (20/22)

How can the West get things done in international diplomacy vis-a-vis an obstructionist Russia?
It depends:

-Bargain with it through 3rd parties
-Overrule it
-Go around it
-Hinder it

I will flesh this out in my upcoming piece - stay tuned (21/22)

Assuming the war against #Ukraine – & relatedly Russia's confrontation with the West - remains the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy for some time to come, these 7 trends will likely continue.

And their 2nd order effects will resonate far beyond #Ukraine. (END)

The piece will be out in @WarOnTheRocks of course, not @WoTR 🤓