Thread by @robsatloff

The resumption of #Saudi-#Iran relations has triggered what I believe to be exaggerated reaction about #China’s emergence as a #MiddleEast powerbroker and a strategic shift of #Riyadh away from its traditional partners. 1/17

Some context: in an October meeting in #Jeddah, a #Saudi leader at the highest level explained his strategy was to defeat #Iran through growth. The fact that KSA is the fastest growing G-20 country, w/trillions invested in everything from tourism to mining, supports this. 2/17

But growth takes time - and growth can be sidetracked through insecurity, whether from #Houthi missiles or the threat of nuclear blackmail. To protect the long-term strategy, he said, KSA needs security. 3/17

Traditionally, the US is the prime provider of such security - through direct arm sales, support and training; partnering to counter immediate dangers; and providing an effective umbrella against strategic threats. 4/17

But US restrictions on arms sales, strong-arming on #Yemen, and inaction on #Iran nuclear progress - which largely transcends anger over the #Khashoggi murder - has combined to chip away at KSA confidence that US is willing to play that role. 5/17

Resuming ties with #Iran is a dramatic expression of this lack of confidence in US. As that senior leader said last October (I paraphrase): “We reach out to talk with #Iran to reduce tensions, if possible. 6/17

“But we want to hear a serious plan that will prevent #Iran from getting a bomb. If Iran does get a bomb, our policy will change – we will become friends with Iran. We live in this neighborhood. We have to survive.” 7/17

My assessment is that inaction at recent #Iran nuclear progress was the final straw that convinced #Riyadh a dramatic step was in order. Having #China midwife the deal is an extra slap to Washington - perhaps to make up for the @WhiteHouse’s 8/17

mistaken attack on #Saudi oil policy in September
or Admin’s refusal to bring subsequent #Saudi policy review to amicable public close. But #China appears to be more a fortuitous beneficiary of this spat, not a serious partner to a new Saudi security architecture. 9/17

Saudis, it seems, are looking not to shift camps but to diversify sources of security. What US can provide, they will take (er, buy). They will pay some protection to #Iran. They will also, in my view, be more open, not less, to ideas from other countries, incl #Israel. 10/17

Indeed, instead of crying that the strategic sky is falling, Israelis should view #Saudi policy not unlike #Emirati policy, which deepened ties with #Jerusalem at the same moment it led the charge to normalize with #Tehran’s top #Arab ally, #Syria. 11/17

A smart #Israeli policy would view the current moment as one of opportunity, with doors opening, not slamming shut. This applies to traditional areas like security and intelligence, as well as to new topics like energy and technology cooperation. 12/17

As for US-#Saudi ties, pique at #Riyadh is understandable but the time-honored axiom applies: physician, heal thyself. 13/17

Successive admins had no serious plan to stop #Iran’s nuclear progress or -w/notable exception of the #Suleimani assassination- do much to prevent expansion of Iran’s regional influence, all the while signaling a desire to escape from #MiddleEast security responsibilities. 14/17

The Saudis read the tea-leaves and acted. But this is a tactical shift, not a strategic change. From ideology to strategy, KSA and #Iran are bitter rivals & committed adversaries; perhaps Saudis are paying to lower the heat of their conflict but it can erupt at any moment. 15/17

In meantime, challenge for US is to revisit its core ME priorities. Are we truly committed to preventing #Iran from a nuclear weapon? What does that mean given #Ukraine war & #China as “pacing challenge”? How do we convince friend and foe that our commitment isn’t hollow? 16/17

We just saw what one security partner did when it lost confidence; we may wake up with a more complicated surprise when another security partner reaches the same conclusion but acts in a different way. 17/17