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Although much of the public debate has centered upon the notion of a "ban on Huawei," it's important to note the Executive Order itself doesn't single out any specific company or country. However, I have some concerns about the potential implications of its framing of the issue.
I've argued from the start this debate should be less about Huawei, despite unique characteristics and its particular prominence in 5G, than about the systemic concerns that arise based on the conditions within which it operates as a Chinese company. aspistrategist.org.au/much-ado-huawe…
However, I also have reservations about the notion of a ban or exclusion targeting all Chinese companies indiscriminately, because of the the impact and precedent that such a measure could establish.
To start, I wonder whether we will see American companies subject to more measures of a similar nature in China going forward justified on similar grounds.
I'm also concerned about the justification and definition of “foreign adversary” as the primary category of discussion in this Executive Order, since I think that is also a troubling precedent.
Personally, I don't see the U.S.-China relationship as inherently or inevitably adversarial. I think it's important to differentiate between discussing strategic competition with a potential adversary and describing another nation as an adversary outright. Such discourse matters.
The definition of foreign adversary used here for the EO is: "any foreign government or foreign non-government person engaged in a long‑term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the [US] or security and safety of [US] persons"
Clearly, China has engaged in conduct and behavior that is adverse at best and deeply damaging at worst to U.S. security and interests, and I agree that it's important to ensure that the presence of Chinese companies in the U.S. is not "unrestricted."
However, I think a stronger precedent and stronger approach to such an executive order would have involved articulating criteria and specific standards as the basis for determinations of risk, rather than going off of designating certain "foreign adversaries."
In particular, if the U.S. government is looking to foster closer coordination with allies and partners on 5G security, I don't think this framing of the issue is the best way to do so, since not all will view threats or adversaries from the same perspective.
That is, I think this Executive Order could be seen as a lost opportunity to articulate a clearer determination of risk factors for vendors and carriers that might have established a precedent that could be more sustainable and broadly applicable going forward.
That is, while I tend to agree the likely outcome of this Executive Order does, on balance, improve the security of the U.S. information and communications technology ecosystem, I'd have hoped for a measure that could have contributed to moving the debate forward more than this.
