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A few quick and general thoughts on the 2019 Chinese white paper on national defense:
1. The white paper contains no language indicating that the PLA has changed its current military strategy (aka the “strategic guidelines” or 战略方针), which was adopted in 2014 and described in the 2015 defense white paper.
For more on the strategic guidelines, my new book describes how they have changed since 1949: amazon.com/Active-Defense…
2. The 2019 white paper contains much stronger and more pointed language about the United States. However, this is unsurprising, given the description of China as a strategic competition and its prominence in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
3. The white paper—for the first time—distinguishes between the basic goals (根本目标) of China’s defense policy and the PLA’s missions and tasks (使命任务) to achieve these goals.
4. The emphasis on internal security issues, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, among others, reflects continued concerns about regime security and domestic roles of China’s armed forces.
5. The emphasis on Taiwan and territorial and maritime disputes underscores how the PLA remains a regionally-focused military.
6. The white paper affirms China’s existing nuclear policy and strategy, based on no-first-use and deterring nuclear attacks on China.
7. The white paper was surprisingly critical of progress in the PLA’s modernization, noting several times how the PLA lags behind.
8. The white paper contains no definition of what the PLA means by the goal of “building a world-class military” by the middle of the century. The term is only mentioned twice. /END
