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After spending 3 days in Bxl talking with senior EU & member state officials about Brexit, here's how I see things. Thread 1/
Mood darkened somewhat over 3 days I've been here. Initial reaction to UK proposals were cautious, but open. The @Europarl_EN wanted to reject plan outright; @JunckerEU & @EU_Commission thought this premature. Juncker's initial statement was welcomed by MS & seen as right line 2/
to take, as @EU_Commission & several EU capitals recognise Govt has taken some big steps - on regulatory side (scope of what in NI would align to EU standards; plus UK conceding role for ECJ). 2 problems, widely reported: 1) customs border in Ireland & 2) governance & Stormont 3/
Each has several issues, as covered by @pmdfoster. But every official I spoke to believes the governance questions are not insurmountable, "Governance is something the EU is good at and we can work on" says one official involved in the discussions. Customs is the problem 4/
1) principle of a N-S border; 2) that it would only work on basis of derogations & exemptions; 3) that it wouldn't be immediately operational (details to be solved during transition) & 4) disassociation of customs & regulatory regime - but regulatory checks take place in 5/
context of EU's customs framework. Can't decouple the two. From EU's perspective, the only way to resolve these issues is for NI to remain fully in EU customs territory - as I've argued previously. Every senior official I spoke to is extremely clear on this point: full solidarity
with Irish; big concern among NW EU states about integrity of Single Market. UK officials also can't credibly articulate what a compromise would *actually look like*. There's some talk of EU being able to establish a new regime which wouldn't require treaty change. Non-starter 7/
There's also annoyance in some capitals that legal text hasn't been widely shared (only with TF50). BUT this unjustified: there's always push back when UK tries to bypass @EU_Commission and deal directly with Heads & capitals; now UK is working directly through @MichelBarnier 8/
So don't see any cause for EU complaints here. UK also (rightly) worried about leaks undermining negotiations. So: can @BorisJohnson @SteveBarclay & @DavidGHFrost move to EU position on customs? This is what EU will test over next week to 11 October. They see mixed UK messages 9/
Extracts from @BorisJohnson speech at Conf that was embargoed talked about this being "final offer". Very tough. But subsequent correspondence to Juncker & explanatory note were much softer. @10DowningStreet changed tack from Tues night to Weds. EU27 noticed. Now curious which 10
approach will prevail in the room in Bxl. Senior UK officials are clear to me that there is space to move - "the proposals exist as a proposition; they are the basis for a landing zone, but these are different things." On Weds, BJ also talked of a "broad" landing zone 11/
However, the distinctions between a "discussion", "negotiation" - & the "tunnel" - are grating on the UK side. "The important question is are we moving in the right direction, rather than a sense of us having our homework marked." Underlying this frustration is sense that the 12/
moves the Govt has made have now all been discounted. "This is a structural flaw. The UK has made a big move by responding with legal text that could be accepted as *part* of the solution. Talk of qualifying for the tunnel are arbitrary." But EU clear these distinctions exist 13/
Based on my chats in Westminster, think BJ can probably move on Stormont governance questions, but not customs. This is a binary issue: EU thinks NI needs to remain in its customs territory; but Govt argues a single UK customs territory is the definition of state sovereignty 14/
So where's the possible landing zone? Hard to see. Also important to note that @DavidGHFrost is co-author of these proposals & said to be a believer in Alternative Arrangements - even though rubbished by EU side. Is he incentivised to move? EU also thinks Barclay tends to 15/
interpret @BorisJohnson statements in the most minimalist way. Are these the 2 agents that are going to deliver a deal? Is there common understanding between them & BJ? These are questions the EU is grappling with as it stress tests UK proposals today & next week. Want clarity 16
BJ has given DUP more or less everything they've asked for. Single customs territory; de facto veto from SM rules/standards. Both need walking back. If he does, potential majority he's constructed begins to unravel: loses DUP, then some of ERG. Number of Labour rebels needed rise
As one senior EU official put it to me, "Boris has given the DUP the keys and the lock. Now he's going to say you need a 6-digit passcode, but here's only 3 of the numbers." Others in London think Govt has put cart before horse, squaring a majority for a deal that doesn't work 18
in Bxl. Like the ill-fated Brady amendment. So the caution/openness in the air in Bxl on Tues has evaporated as TF50 & member states have studied UK ideas in more detail. Some EU MS officials I spoke to on Tues were noticeably harder on Thurs & Fri The discussions last night 19
among 27 have built on @JunckerEU initial position: There are currently no negotiations; only probing of UK position to see how far Govt can now go. If no substantive movement by middle of next week, @EU_Commission may issue a statement to prepare ground among member states 20/
October Council will then take stock of no deal plans while discussing What EU should do when A50 extension request is made. However, if there is good progress, officials have earmarked the possibility of a second Council 1 week after 17-18 October meeting (24-25th) to secure 21/
"political agreement". Even here, however, a technical extension would be needed. That is, EU officials see no way around an extension - even in a deal scenario. But the mood is glum. One senior EU official says there's "no hope". Just spinning wheels till next Friday 22/
However, EU also recognise they don't have a good answer to what happens if this plan doesn't go through. UK officials caution that the EU needs to think about what platform they want @BorisJohnson to run on in an election 23/
After all, this is the Tory plan for Brexit. If BJ delivers a majority, he'll either come back and try to implement it; or seek a no deal in belief that's the only way to secure it (as no deal, will, ultimately keep NI in UK's customs territory). But senior EU officials admit 24/
that it's hard for them to be tactical. They can't accept a hole in the Single Market. They can't blindly "trust" Govt's promises - less so Boris than @theresa_may. So we stick at 10% for full Boris pivot - but believe most likely outcome is an election & a big mess after ENDS
