The presence of the #terrorist & intelligence arm of #QudsForce on Turkish soil. How #Turkey enables Iranians to operate as a central base country, for the logistical & operational operation of QF & #Iranian intelligence vis-à-vis target countries in Europe & the Middle East.
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Iranian intelligence sees it as #Iran's "operational backyard" vis-à-vis the Middle East and Europe, as #Turkey has a number of clear advantages, including:
- proximity to Iran and relatively easy mobility of operatinal it and through it (air and land)
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- proximity to Iran and relatively easy mobility of operatinal it and through it (air and land)
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- Iranian citizens do not need a visa to enter the country
- This geographical location central and attractive holding secret meetings with #terrorist organizations throughout the world (Middle East, Europe, South East Asia)
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- This geographical location central and attractive holding secret meetings with #terrorist organizations throughout the world (Middle East, Europe, South East Asia)
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- Cooperation With headquarters of #terrorist organizations operating from #Turkey & neighboring countries such as Syria and Lebanon.
An increase in the level of daring & impudence of Iranians is identified due to the feeling that everything is allowed & possible in Turkey.
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An increase in the level of daring & impudence of Iranians is identified due to the feeling that everything is allowed & possible in Turkey.
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A similar activity, with the face to Asia, was also observed in #Malaysia, which served as a logistics station for the #QudsForce for the #terrorist operations it initiated against Israeli targets in South Asian countries.
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#Iranian intelligence relies on 4 operating infrastructures:
• #Diplomatic missions - placing Iranian intelligence personnel under diplomatic cover of cultural attachés and secretaries, similar to the recently uncovered spy networks across Europe.
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• #Diplomatic missions - placing Iranian intelligence personnel under diplomatic cover of cultural attachés and secretaries, similar to the recently uncovered spy networks across Europe.
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• #Straw_companies - Iran has established a number of straw companies and financial infrastructure for operational needs in Turkey.
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• #Cultural_centers - Iranian intelligence uses Turkish citizens who have been recruited under the auspices of spiritual and cultural centers as "intelligence assets" for the benefit of various missions in Turkey and abroad.
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• #Criminal_elements - Cooperation with local criminal organizations that specialize in activities related to international smuggling of people, drugs and weapons.
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In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the nature of #Iranian covert activities on #Turkish soil & they now include:
• Recruitment, operation & meetings with agents
• Intelligence gathering
• Kidnapping & terrorism operations
• Smuggling of weapons
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• Recruitment, operation & meetings with agents
• Intelligence gathering
• Kidnapping & terrorism operations
• Smuggling of weapons
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In October 2013, an indictment was filed in Israel against Alex Mans (#Ali_Mansouri), a Belgian citizen born in #Iran, accused of being recruited by Iranian intelligence in order to #spy on Israel and develop a fictitious infrastructure.
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According to the indictment, the operation was carried out by a senior Iranian intelligence official named #Mahdi_Hambabi, and for the purpose of the cover story, the Iranian agent was required to adhere to the claim that he was a Belgian businessman.
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Mahdi Mansouri revealed #Haji_Hamid_Na'amati as his main contact person and even said that it was necessary to establish straw companies for the purpose of the coverage story, including a company called #Efgs whose coverage infrastructure was established in Antalya, Turkey.
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In Sep 2019, a classified Turkish intelligence document was uncovered on one of the Turkish websites revealing how #Erdogan's pro-Iranian government managed to shelve an investigation file run by a forensic investigation team against Turkish #Quds operatives and assets.
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The document, dated 03,2, 2017, signed by Turkey's Deputy Director General of Intelligence shows how the Turkish government ordered the heads of the Turkish intel organization to identify all people involved in an investigation conducted btw 2007-2013 & shelve its findings.
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As part of the investigation file, documentation was also collected of encounters between members of the #QudsForce with #Turkish assets.
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General Nasser Jeffrey, a senior member of Unit 400 of the #QudsForce, who also serves as head of a space also in charge of #Turkey, and #Bahnam_Shahariri (under the cover name), commander of Unit 190 - the weapons smuggling unit of QF in charge of shipments
of
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of
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missiles and weapons from Iran to terrorist organizations in Gaza and #Hezbollah in Lebanon.
These measures are transmitted by sea and air and in other cases through the land axis that connects #Iran to #Syria and from there to the Lebanon Valley.
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These measures are transmitted by sea and air and in other cases through the land axis that connects #Iran to #Syria and from there to the Lebanon Valley.
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Unit 190 also handles the smuggling of chemicals used to make missiles and explosive devices.
Btw 2009 - 2012, #Shaharari was also involved in the transfer of weapons & explosives to #Turkey and #Azerbaijan as part of the #QF and #Hezbollah plots to carry out a series of
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Btw 2009 - 2012, #Shaharari was also involved in the transfer of weapons & explosives to #Turkey and #Azerbaijan as part of the #QF and #Hezbollah plots to carry out a series of
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inferno attacks against #Israeli missions in #Istanbul and #Baku.
General Nasser Jeffrey - Documentation from a meeting with an "intelligence property" at the Istanbul Metro.
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General Nasser Jeffrey - Documentation from a meeting with an "intelligence property" at the Istanbul Metro.
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Documents in the investigation file into #QudsForce operations in Turkey also compiled a list of Iranian agents and Turkish recruits previously suspected of #terrorist ties with #Iran and reactivated in recent years after being released by the #Erdogan government.
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Some of those activists were trained in #Iran and engaged in surveillance operations at the embassies and consulates of the #US and #Israel, along with gathering information on #NATO military installations.
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The investigation file also revealed the secret ties of the heads of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (#MIT) with their #Iranian counterparts, during the years the organization was run by Kan Fidan.
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In October 2013, the Washington Post revealed that #Turkey was in fact functioning as a "dual agent" that maintained parallel relations with Western intelligence services alongside covert ties with Iranian intelligence.
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This relationship even led to the suspicion in early 2012 that #Turkish intelligence had revealed to the Iranians details of an #Israeli spy network that operated in Turkey and included the operation of about 10 Iranian citizens.
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The report states that #Israel estimated that the head of Turkish intelligence at the time, #HakanFidan, known for his pro-Iranian positions, was the one who acted to pass the information on to the Iranians.
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The investigation documents revealed that on January 3, 2013, a "warm alert" was issued by the Israeli #Mossad for planning terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets. Intelligence revealed that #Ali_Khodadi, an Iranian agent who was involved in February 2012 in
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planning a #terrorist attack aimed at the Israeli embassy in Georgia, also visited Turkey to gather intelligence and set up a sabotage laboratory.
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The information provided by the #Mossad warned that a citizen of Georgian descent named Lila Stirashvili is in Turkey & is working to establish the network that Khodadi awarded. The institution provided the mobile phone numbers used by the #terrorist infrastructure in Turkey.
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In April 2013, an Afghan citizen identified by the #QudsF was identified by the #Mossad in order to help smuggle #terrorist operatives from the Turkish border to Greece and from there to target countries in #Europe as part of a terrorist campaign planned by Iran.
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The person identified as the head of the infrastructure is #Muhsan_Bakitar, an Iranian living in Istanbul.
The intelligence that flowed to the Turkish security forces came not only from Israel but also from the intelligence services of the #US and even of #Arab countries.
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The intelligence that flowed to the Turkish security forces came not only from Israel but also from the intelligence services of the #US and even of #Arab countries.
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In July 2013, the #Saudi embassy passed on information to the local police, revealing an Iranian plan to hit Saudi diplomatic targets on #Turkish soil.
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Contractors of #QudsForce and #Iranian intelligence:
In the past year, there have been increasing indications of the use by Quds Force of activists of foreign origin as well as of #Turkish execution contractors belonging to organized criminal organizations.
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In the past year, there have been increasing indications of the use by Quds Force of activists of foreign origin as well as of #Turkish execution contractors belonging to organized criminal organizations.
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In October 2019, Albanian police announced the unveiling of a #terrorist infrastructure deployed by Unit 840 of the #QudsForce in #Albania. It is a secret unit designed to thwart Western elements and Western contacts.
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The attack was supposed to be carried out by mercenaries from members of a Turkish criminal organization controlled by #Abdalsam_Turgot, head of a criminal organization specializing in human, arms and drug smuggling. Crossing border crossings such as #Turkey and #Bulgaria,
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where crossings of #Iranians with forged passports have been arrested and interrogated in recent years.
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The ties with the criminal organization were built by #Abdulkhalg_Malek_Zeda - a senior #Iranian agent born in 1979 who holds an Iranian has already served in #Malaysia and #Oman, before being stationed in Antalya, Turkey.
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The blog found that the agent operated from #Turkey through a straw company whose original function was to move goods and means between the base countries and the target countries, money laundering from drugs to finance activities and through money exchange services, rental
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and sale of vehicles, management of accommodation to land smuggling routes. And naval means through the criminal path created for him by members of the #Turkish criminal organization.
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#Malek_Zada was identified as an "intelligence asset" recruited by the head of the #Caucasus and #Turkey region in Unit 840 of the Quds Force known as "Feiman".
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Following the revelation of the #terrorist cell in #Albania, another operational logistics network of Iranian intelligence based in Istanbul was recently unveiled. The network is headed by #Hussein_Hafez_Amini, an Iranian citizen currently living in Istanbul who runs, among
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other things, a small Turkish airline called #Ray_Airlines. Amini is considered a key figure who heads one of Iran's #terrorist networks in Turkey, which carries out various operational activities while taking advantage of his personal ties with aviation companies to carry
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out various transportation missions in order to circumvent the sanctions imposed on #Iran.
As a result of his reckless conduct, his connections with his Iranian operatives have recently been revealed, including once again those identified by the code name #Feiman and
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As a result of his reckless conduct, his connections with his Iranian operatives have recently been revealed, including once again those identified by the code name #Feiman and
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two other "intelligence assets" corresponding to the names Hussein and Hassan. The missions imposed on the network apparently also include kidnapping and assassination of opponents of the #Iranian regime.
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Examples of this could be seen in the abductions and assassinations of #Iranian regime #opponents living in #Turkey or one of the European countries.
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Among the #QudsForce operatives operated by Feiman in Turkey was #Abdulkahlek_Malek_Zeda, an asset of Quds Force Unit 840, which was linked to planning a terrorist attack against Iranian opposition figures on Albanian soil.
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Amini's role as CEO of #Rayairline is valuable as he can assist a #QudsForce in transferring weapons, hostages or cash intended for attacks in various countries, through airports. Cargo planes are recognized as part of QF smuggling squadron on the Iran-Syria route.
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This is how #Iran recruits and employs foreign activists: Following the report on the extensive Iranian activity in Turkey, the name of #Hassan_Shaabani_Galvani, an Iranian cleric born in April 1977, who is fluent in Turkish and Azeri, has been mentioned in the past.
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For the past several years he has been the main recruiter and operator of the #Quds_Force in locating and recruiting #Turkish citizens, training them and directing them to carry out various missions.
In addition to its official religious and educational activities at an
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In addition to its official religious and educational activities at an
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institution in the city of #Tabriz called the "Cultural Front of the Islamic Revolution of East Azerbaijan Province", the institution also serves Galvani as a cover for bringing candidates to serve as "intelligence assets" in various countries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan.
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These are invited by #Galvani to Iran under the auspices of religious activities and undergo an actual process of scrutiny and recrutment.
Galvani also occasionally goes on operational rounds abroad, for meetings with
"Properties."
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Galvani also occasionally goes on operational rounds abroad, for meetings with
"Properties."
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Among the activists (assets) that #Galvani has recruited in recent years, one can point to a number of #Turkish citizens:
Vulcan Click (U04123648), Mehmet Kenan Bolot (U11285417), Arif Sam Kalchi (S02507001), Riza Golli (U04737620), Arif Shintkin (U07026323).
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Vulcan Click (U04123648), Mehmet Kenan Bolot (U11285417), Arif Sam Kalchi (S02507001), Riza Golli (U04737620), Arif Shintkin (U07026323).
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These activists are just part of an impressive list of assets raised by #QudsForce on Turkish soil.
In July 2017, Galvani met with a Turkish property named #Arif_Sahintkin living in Germany.
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In July 2017, Galvani met with a Turkish property named #Arif_Sahintkin living in Germany.
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During their meeting, he was observed this time without the religious attire that characterizes him and even allowed himself to take the property he operates for the whimsical nightlife round. They were monitored and documented throughout the sessions.
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These and other people recruited by the #QudsForce continue to visit #Iran from time to time, at Galvani's invitation.
Hassan Shaabani Galvani with a #Turkish property named Arif Shintkin
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Hassan Shaabani Galvani with a #Turkish property named Arif Shintkin
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During August 20, Jasmine Jaber, a resident of the Old City of Jerusalem, working at the National Library, was arrested for questioning after suspicion arose that she had been recruited by the #Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. She left Lebanon in 2015.
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As part of Jaber's operation by #Hezbollah, meetings were held with her in #Turkey, and instructions were given to her by Rand Wahba, a Hezbollah operative in the joint terrorist unit who also acted against her in an operational nickname on behalf of the unit called Wafaa.
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Jaber was clarified that her role is to recruit more activists in #Israel who will serve as a cell under her guidance, while emphasizing the importance of recruiting elements from among Israeli Arabs, especially women, who benefit from their ability to move freely in Israel.
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These investigations have led to the revelation of #Hezbollah's practices, including the use of covert means of communication, including through the transmission of coded messages on social networks, the holding of operating meetings in various countries around the world,
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with emphasis on #Turkey and the use of fictitious nicknames by activists. In the recruitment process in front of civilian factors.
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The End.
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The End.
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