Some thoughts about the Britain is Greece myth: it has a true core, but there are important differences. /1
1) Greece was about EU but mostly about Euro shortly after a heavy crisis. Current comparisons with Greece need to be understood in that context. /2
2) If Greece has shown something, than that national states are alive and have interests they pursue with all the power instruments at their service. This is especially true if the incident is seen directly or indirectly as an existential threat. /3
3) Greece crisis was conflict WITHIN EU, Brexit's a conflict b/w EU & soon-to-be 3rd party. It makes a difference: within EU member states're restraint by process when dealing w/ other members, not so by dealing w/ outsiders - they can even use combined force of other members. /4
4) EU is flexible, but just to some extent. It depends on the receiver of flexibility and the reason why flexibility is necessary. However, it operates on the idea that conflicts b/w members need to be channelled and softened. /5
This is important: if flexibility is asked in matters which could directly or indirectly effect the way how member states interact with each other (in a negative way), they will long on core of their rules. Asking to drop key rules but compromise on access is problematic. /6
What else prevents other members to ask for concessions important to them but contradicting with core of EU arrangements. If UK outside EU gets its cake on tantrums of UK's electorate, what do you do if GER electorate asks for it? /7
Flexibility if possible but never more than necessary! /8
5) Don't forget UK's history within EU. It was always an awkward partner, one who was happy to push for opt outs and special treatments - beyond what other members demanded. Not just Thatcher's "no no no" but also difficulties with India-EU-FTA are part of it. /9
UK is big, which made it difficult to resist as long as UK is inside. If UK's outside it's easier since all tools of power play can & will be used. EU's certainly aware of UK's exceptionalism & it doesn't go down well, neither in Brussels nor in capitals or the electorates. /10
This leads us to the last point, demanding flexibility is always difficult if it is clear that this flexibility will be used against EU in future (re)negotiations. That provides even less incentives - good faith cuts both ways. /11
In short: yes there are similarities, but also differences which are significant and likely to rather hit UK than EU. 12/12
