Thread by @RALee85

Another article that incorrectly talks about the so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine" and criticizes the US for preparing for the wrong fight. Of course, the Russian military has greater capabilities today than in 2008, but new capabilities≠a new doctrine.
iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/10/russia…

Gerasimov's now-famous article in VPK was taken from a speech he gave to Soviet veterans of the war in Afghanistan, which is an unlikely place to announce a new military doctrine. His speech described how he believed warfare had changed, specifically what the US was doing. 2/

Much of this was not new. Russian officials have long said that the Color Revolutions (the article emphasizes the Arab Spring as well) were orchestrated by the US and the CIA, often using NGOs as an intermediary (which is why Russia cracked down on foreign NGOs). 3/

Russian officials saw this as an American means of conducting regime change in these countries without using overt conventional military force. Gerasimov argues that the US is using SOF, PMCs, NGOs, social media, propaganda, and sanctions to achieve strategic objectives. 4/

But as Charles Bartles notes, "Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine." 5/
usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryR…

There is near unanimity among Western experts on Russian mil strategy who have criticized the emphasis on hybrid warfare or a "Gerasimov Doctrine" including Bettina Renz: eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34877/1/B%20Re…
Roger McDermott: worldinwar.eu/wp-content/upl…
Andrew Monaghan: ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameter… 5/

Michael Kofman has written a number of articles as well (wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/…; warontherocks.com/2016/03/russia…) in addition to Mark Galeotti's article from March denying the Gerasimov Doctrine's existence (foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-…). 6/

Using the US' example, Russia has invested in new capabilities such as their KSSO SOF unit (explicitly based on Western SOF), PMCs, and IO. These new capabilities allow Russia to conduct FID/advise and assist missions more effectively than they could previously. 7/

But these new capabilities and tools of statecraft are included in Russia's existing military doctrine/FP, and, of course, the US already has all of these capabilities. Why don't we talk about US military doctrine in hybrid warfare terms as well? 8/

The article dismisses criticisms of the "Gerasimov Doctrine" by saying these analysts are too focused on Russia's conventional capabilities, and avers that "Russian officers of all ranks do not doubt either its existence or its dominance." 9/

Which is a hyperbolic comment, as they certainly have not discussed the topic with "Russian officers of all ranks" nor do all Russian officers write articles in VPK or Voennaya Mysl (which the authors rely on for their analysis). 10/

They add, "These articles are part of a clear effort to drive the doctrine deep into the institutional thought of the Russian Armed Forces, which would likely shape its development for years to come." How would they know unless they know the curriculum for new officers? 11/

Indeed, many of the lessons that Russia has drawn from Syria and Ukraine emphasize traditional military capabilities, like the continuing utility of tanks, better equipped IFVs, massed artillery fire, etc., which are already being implemented in Russian TTPs and procurement. 12/

The article notes, "These doctrinal changes will shape and guide the Kremlin’s broader effort to modernize the Russian Armed Forces" but Russia's procurement plans in GPV-2027 still emphasize traditional military capabilities. 13/

Russia's Strategic nuclear forces remains a priority, and its Ground Forces are now a priority (they were neglected under GPV-2020). In addition, since 2014, Russia has emphasized the development of divisions in the Western and Southern Militarily Districts. 14/

These are the Districts that would be most involved in a conflict with NATO, and Russia's military leadership views divisions as better equipped for large-scale conventional warfare than brigades, which were the OOB focus under Serdyukov. 15/

While Russia has developed a number of non-kinetic capabilities (cyber, EW, etc.), these are capabilities that would be useful in a conventional conflict as well (not to mention they support deterrence), so they should not be seen exclusively as "hybrid" capabilities. 16/

Russia continues to emphasize large conventional operations in their annual training exercises (i.e. Vostok-2018), which involve coordinating the efforts of multiple military districts and nearly every branch of the Russian Armed Forces. 17/

The article says, "Russia instead is attempting to offset - rather than match - the capabilities of the U.S. and NATO." Actually Russia is trying to match NATO's capabilities in addition to developing asymmetric ones. 18/

GPV-2027 emphasizes procurement of PGMs, including cruise missiles, as does the Russian Navy's procurement plans on "Kalibrizing" the Navy with small surface ships that can launch Kalibr cruise missiles. Russia has long been concerned with the cruise missile gap with the US. 19/

The US Prompt Global Strike program is mentioned all the time in Russian defense journals. Russia very much wants to achieve parity in this conventional capability, which likely played a significant role in the INF violations as GLCMs are cheaper than building ship-based CMs. 20/

Perhaps the most frustrating part of the article is how sure it is in its conclusions. It simply states as fact that Russian officers of all ranks buy into this without evidence. 21/

The truth is we can't be sure how pervasive these views are, but we can look at procurement decisions, training exercises, and official documents (all of which indicate that hybrid warfare is not a part of Russian doctrine). 22/end