U.S.-ROK cost-sharing negotiations ‘back to square one’?
As a former alliance manager, let me paint a picture for you of how this happens & why it shouldn’t have happened.
(Thread...)
As a former alliance manager, let me paint a picture for you of how this happens & why it shouldn’t have happened.
(Thread...)
2/Cost-sharing agreements were put in place to offset the cost of stationing US forces overseas.
They include cost-sharing for things like labor (typically local national employees on US bases), utilities, and construction.
They include cost-sharing for things like labor (typically local national employees on US bases), utilities, and construction.
3/By design, they are renegotiated every few years (every 5 years in this case).
This makes sense, seeing as economic factors can change (fluctuating currency exchange rates, slow or negative GDP growth, etc.), as well as changes to force posture or other alliance contributions.
This makes sense, seeing as economic factors can change (fluctuating currency exchange rates, slow or negative GDP growth, etc.), as well as changes to force posture or other alliance contributions.
4/The limited duration of cost-sharing agreements was *not* built-in to accommodate ideological shifts based on leadership changes.
Yet, the expiration of the US-ROK SMA opened a window for Korea to become a target of Trump’s campaign against ‘free-riding’ allies.
Yet, the expiration of the US-ROK SMA opened a window for Korea to become a target of Trump’s campaign against ‘free-riding’ allies.
5/US-side negotiators would have been given an impossible bargaining window (or win-set) of roughly 150-200% the previous agreement.
Sound absurd? Take it from a former alliance manager, it is crazy.
It’s a crude analogy, but I’ll try explaining it simply in the next tweet...
Sound absurd? Take it from a former alliance manager, it is crazy.
It’s a crude analogy, but I’ll try explaining it simply in the next tweet...
6/Let’s say you subscribe to Netflix & they say “we want a ten percent increase in fees (~$1/month) so we can add new/great content.”
Fair enough.
But say it’s this: “We want to DOUBLE your fees. We aren’t adding anything, we just don’t think you paid enough before.”
Hold up.
Fair enough.
But say it’s this: “We want to DOUBLE your fees. We aren’t adding anything, we just don’t think you paid enough before.”
Hold up.
7/Credit to US-Korea negotiators here. Based on news reporting, it appears they managed to get to an ‘ad ref’ agreement (agreement at the table that needs higher level ratification) despite the high bar, but it got torpedoed by the White House for not being enough.
8/Perhaps it’s just brinkmanship to try to eke out a little more from the Korean side. Perhaps the Trump administration really is ready to reduce US troop numbers if its high demands aren’t met.
Either way, it’s bad for the alliance.
Either way, it’s bad for the alliance.
9/Disingenuous negotiation tactics are harmful in long-term relationships, and threats of reducing forces amplify fears of abandonment of alliance obligations.
Plainly, it’s damaging at a time when North Korea undoubtedly benefits from seams in the US-ROK alliance.
Plainly, it’s damaging at a time when North Korea undoubtedly benefits from seams in the US-ROK alliance.
10/A tendency for higher level decision-makers is to compartmentalize alliance & security issues when they ought to be keeping the big picture in mind.
Certainly, it makes decision-making easier, but it invariably leads to bad policy or, in this case, poor alliance management.
Certainly, it makes decision-making easier, but it invariably leads to bad policy or, in this case, poor alliance management.
