Thread by @Mikeknightsiraq

My new 2.000-word @WashInstitute @FikraForum piece on how US govt should overcome its own internal debate on US policy towards Iran-backed elements of the PMF, attempting to strike a sensible middle ground that can work in the long-run washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/vie…

First I lay out the 2 schools of thought in USG: first, the patient school that thinks Muhandis/Iran-controlled PMF r manageable & just an evolution of special groups. This school views US support to ISF as largely sufficient to offset PMF growth and caution against upsetting it

Second, the activist school, that views the Muhandis/Iran-controlled PMF as a fast-growing tumor that could be fatal to Iraqi pluralism & then US-Iraq relationship unless urgently treated. Activists see the need for imminent surgery, even at risk to the US/ISF relationship.

I then give a concise summary of where the PMF appears to be today, in a number of crucial dimensions, to set a factual basis. The PMF is still small & lightly funded, with few combat forces & split on factional lines, but it remains popular and cannot be disestablished in full.

Then I provide 4 scenarios for the future PMF. They're quite subtle shades: I hope they capture the genuine possibilities, excluding unlikely "black swans" like full disestablishment of the PMF. A common theme: funding & distribution of resources will determine PMF future status.

Whichever camp - patience or activism - you are in, you now have a toolkit to work with. I conclude with strong and specific policy prescriptions - which all policy analysis should have, or else what's the point?

First - no US leader, at any rank or position, should ever publicly mention PMF/Hashd again. Ever. Dodge every question because it's none of our business whether Iraq has a thing called PMF. Behind closed doors the US needs to be specific and realistic.

Second, as a major donor & sec cooperation partner, the Combined Joint Task Force members & other donor nations/organizations have the right to guide Iraq away from creating new duplicate security institutions -- i.e., a permanent line-item PMF ministry.

Third, much US concern about PMF relates 2 the unchecked leadership of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis - a US-designated terrorist & a surrogate for a foreign nation, Iran - and use of Iraqi state funds to pay U.S.-designated terrorist groups who serve Iran. Why not privately discuss this?

Fourth, it is in both Iraqi & US interests for the Iran-backed PMF (& their embedded Iranians) to be under the same restrictions & oversight as CJTF forces in Iraq. This means no unilateral, un-monitored facilities & missions. Govt of Iraq needs robust presence at all bases.

Particular care should b invested 2 ensure no ISF unit - including PMF - gets exclusive control of revenue-generating infrastructure. Muhandis PMF routinely mirror CJTF forces in Iraq, so they should not feel too surprised if ISF does the same 2 them. Parallelism is a tradition.

Finally, there is tremendous value in the US-ISF relationship, incl potentially with a post-Muhandis/KH/Nujaba PMF. The ISF needs a lot more units & people, so if/when PMF trims or sheds manpower, CJTF should work rapidly to ensure this manpower is scooped up by ISF.

To b clear, withdrawing US support from ISF wholesale, or even from individual ministries wholesale, is a very bad idea. It would make more sense, if leverage requires such steps, to cut off specific units and personalities for specific reasons, and to make resumption conditional

The pragmatic punchline in this piece has been cropping up in my thoughts since @meisenstadt58 and I wrote this @WarOnTheRocks piece: warontherocks.com/2017/05/mini-h…

To telescope in to the key idea: one unitary, cohesive Iraqi IRGC-clone or Lebanese Hezbollah in Iraq is the proximate outcome that needs to be avoided as our (Iraq/US) minimum objective, and this outcome can be avoided.