Thread by @JennyCafarella

Thoughts on the option to retain a few hundred US troops in Deir ez Zour

Mission is still counter-#ISIS but the policy concerns include preventing #Iran, #Assad, & #Russia from seizing the oil fields. Our presence has (so far) had that secondary effect

So what can ~200 guys do?

~200 guys at best gives us a foothold & preserves:

-intel --> high value strikes on #ISIS & #AlQaeda
-some tribal support. At minimum ability to compete 4 it
-some kinetic ability to defend vs #Assad,#Iran,#Russia expansion
-option 2 surge forces again

NOT a long term solution

A small presence of ~200 guys essentially means a single US base in Deir ez Zour. It does not enable us to secure all of the oil fields. The #SDF would be responsible for securing that infrastructure, with - in theory - air and artillery support from our limited residual force

Securing the oil thus assumes that our small residual presence is enough to keep enough #SDF forces on side to actually secure the fields. #Assad, #Iran, & #Russia will increase their efforts to secure defections. Game on.

US airpower here would be our biggest leverage

The US could likely supply a small contingent of ~200 special forces via air, thus reducing the requirement for a ground supply line from #Iraq which would be tenuous at best

Those forces would need to keep their artillery to mitigate against disruptions to air support

With an air supply line, we can't provide much material support to the #SDF forces we'd be asking to stand by us & fight vs #ISIS & also vs expansion by #Assad/#Iran/#Russia.

So our offer would be air support + artillery + the possibility we'll get more involved in the future

A few hundred special forces guys at a single base won't be able to wage an effective counter-insurgency against #ISIS, esp without the ability to train & equip a partner force.

This is at best an option to hang on long enough for a reconsideration in DC

Now, there is value in doing what we can to preserve the absolute minimum of future options. #ISIS will resurge (already is). Re-entry into #Syria after a complete withdrawal would be significantly more difficult than expanding a limited residual presence

While we can't defeat the #ISIS insurgency with a limited & constrained residual presence, we can disrupt it.

Preventing #Assad/#Iran/#Russia from expanding east does help dampen the ISIS resurgence. ISIS is bouncing back fastest in areas presumably under their control

#ISIS's attacks in central Syria vs #Assad, #Iran, & #Russia are so far the most sophisticated & successful. Terrain does play a part, but so does a lack of focus on ISIS

ISIS's return will also accelerate in the east if the population faces a choice between ISIS or Assad

#Raqqa seems to be a pretty big gap in this approach. A presence in Deir ez Zour doesn't position us to do much in #Raqqa & the stabilization force there depends on our military assistance, which we'd have to halt if we could only do air supply to a base out east

That said, it depends on the details. We don't know how many troops are under consideration. Its possible they'd establish multiple bases.

A residual US presence may also enable other coalition partners to contribute/retain some forces

Supply lines still tough though

More options emerge if the President takes @LindseyGrahamSC's recommendation to pursue a demilitarized zone in the north to de-escalate between #Turkey & "the Kurds" #YPG

If that happened (& worked) there may be trade space for the US to reopen a ground supply line to the #SDF

@LindseyGrahamSC tldr We have only bad & worse options. A residual American presence may be the least bad because it preserves some leverage & future options that we lose in a full withdrawal. It would be tough, involve risks & require resolve. Its feasible if we have the will, and thats the rub.