As is likely in the case of #PS752, when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air 655, the sensors on the cruiser had all the info necessary to see that the target was not military. A series of misjudgements and oversights by the crew led to the disaster. 2/
However, the Vincennes’ helicopter had recently taken fire from an Iranian fast attack boat, and the ship was in Iranian waters in response. Iran Air 655 was coming from the direction of a major Iranian military base too. So there was a plausible military threat at the time. 3/
Next lets look at MH-17. MH-17 was, like #PS752, a victim of irresponsible SAM operator procedure and a litany of mistakes using a Russian SAM - in that case, an SA-11 TELAR. However, unlike the SA-15 which is self-contained, the SA-11 was operating in incomplete form. 4/
SA-11 is designed to operate in a battery, with dedicated fire control and target acquisition radars, as well as a command and control vehicle. These were not provided to the separatists, who were only using the smaller radar and systems on a launch vehicle. 5/
As a result, they had v limited situational awareness and ability to fuse external information than the system was designed for. MH-17 was also shot down by irregular forces operating without easy access to air traffic control data. Different from the SA-15 or USS Vincennes. 6/
Finally on MH-17, the Russian backed seperatists had been shooting MANPADS and other weapons at every Ukrainian Air Force asset they could see for months. When provided with a larger SA-11, they hit a military An-26 transport at 26,000ft a few days before MH-17. 7/
MH-17 was in contact with Ukrainian ATC, but rebels had no ATC. They assumed MH-17 was military because it didn’t occur to them that it might not be. It was also on a threat vector from West to East, similar to An-26. So, like USS Vincennes, SA-11 crew had plausible target ID. 8/
All reasons why it was criminally irresponsible of Russia to provide a SAM with high-altitude capabilities to a non-state group in a warzone where civil traffic could be present. But moving on. Finally, KAL 007 and LN 114 which were shot down by Soviet and Israeli fighters. 9/
In both these cases, the airliners in question actually accidentally violated Soviet and Israeli restricted airspace respectively. The interceptors were instructed to shoot them down by higher authorities as potential threats because they were way off course. 10/
Whilst there is a sad history of mis-IDing and destroying civilian airliners especially during crises, #PS752 still stands out. None of the others were shot down by a state whilst in its own airspace, under radar control by its own ATC, sticking accurately to a flight plan. End/
