1.The strike on the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 was both an operational and a strategic success - the reactor was completely destroyed, all of our pilots returned home safely, and the nuclear threat was delayed by many years.
2. No less important, Israel provided Assad with deniability - and this decreased the likelihood of a Syrian retaliatory response that could have escalated to war.
3.Between the Tigris and Euphrates, between 1981 and 2007, 2 reactors were destroyed in 2 “once-in-a-generation” strikes after 2 historic and bold decisions were taken by the political and military decision-makers.
4.The decision to strike a nuclear reactor in an enemy state controlled by a dictator calling for Israel’s destruction is among the toughest decisions that an Israeli leader can face.
5.PM Menahem Begin founded the unofficial doctrine that calls for doing so, which is named after him and guides Israel until today. The decision to strike carries operational, political, and escalatory risks.
6.From the historic perspective, those who estimated that enforcing the Begin doctrine would be less risky than a dictator calling for Israel’s destruction acquiring a nuclear weapon were correct.
7.Assad and Saddam, who did not hesitate to use chemical weapons against their own people, could have been a most dangerous enemy when armed with nuclear weapons.Nevertheless, one should consider a number of risks facing Israeli decision-makers in 1981 and 2007.
8.Operational risks-reactors are usually high value targets and are therefore well-protected,meaning that operations include risks such as loss of aircraft/pilots or mission complications(the strike in 1981 was shortly after the failed U.S. effort to rescue its hostages in Iran).
9.Political risks - the international community is opposed to preventative strikes and sees them as aggression rather than self-defense. It could possibly respond by imposing sanctions or other high cost actions towards Israel.
10.Escalatory risks - the enemy’s response could be significant and painful, from firing missiles and rockets at Israel to all-out war.Time may have ultimately allowed for less extreme options than a strike.
11.There was a possibility that the hostile regime will be replaced by a friendly one or that the great powers will take care of the problem (as in the Libyan case).
12.The latter was PM Olmert’s hope when asking President G.W. Bush to strike the reactor in Syria - a request that was denied by Washington.
13.The importance of striking the reactor before it went “hot”-at an early stage of the project and before the enemy has gained operational capability.A strike at the beginning of the project may be seen as illegitimate as non-military options were not exhausted...
14...but delaying the decision leads to the expiration of the military option to prevent one’s enemy from acquiring nuclear weapons.
15.On a technical level, destroying a reactor can only delay a determined regime from acquiring nuclear weapons for a number of years. According to those who oppose strikes, it may actually increase enemy motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.
16.Despite the dangers and complexities,the two operations achieved complete destruction of the reactors and were executed without any losses.
17.It is important to remember that the mission in 1981 was far more complex operationally - against heavy Iraqi air defense on high alert and without IAF mid-air refueling capabilities or precision munitions. The main problem in 2007 was preventing a war.
18.The enemies’ responses were minimal and did not lead to war both in 1981 and in the Syrian case, where it was a much more realistic possibility due to the shared border with Israel and Assad’s confidence shortly after the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
19.War was prevented in 2007 thanks to a thoughtful strategy that included not claiming responsibility for the strike and allowing Assad to deny that anything had happened.
20.The internat' reaction in 81 was fairly moderate,though it included condemnation and short lived sanctions.The reaction in 2007 was one of support due to the fact that Israel kept its allies in the loop,as well as the strategy of providing Assad with the room for deniability.
21.History proves that strikes delay nuclear ambitions longer than the simple “technical delays” they cause to the projects. Despite Syrian and Iraqi motivation to repair their nuclear programs, they were delayed by at least 10 years by the strike...
22...and additional events including the Gulf War and the Syrian Civil war, delayed them further.That being said, it is important to keep in mind that two instances do not form the basis for an eternal doctrine. .
23.Our enemies have learned the lessons of the strikes in Syria and Iraq and pose more serious operational and political challenges presently and in future.Israeli future leaders cant escape deep analyses of targets,risks and strategies when hostile states seek nuclear weapons
