Thread by @Usherwood

Thanks to @CommonsEUexit for inviting us to give evidence.

A couple of observations:

1/

https://twitter.com/CommonsEUexit/status/1057560115824549890

The first is my frequent exhortation that the UK debate also needs to take account of the EU debate.

2/

The EU isn't there to nod through the wishes of the UK, whatever they might be.

Appreciating EU preferences is an integral part of Brexit negotiations

3/

This doesn't mean giving way to the EU, but it does mean showing the EU the kind of respect you'd want them to show the UK

4/

In the immediate context of the session, that means recognising that decisions in the UK in and around ratification will have impacts on the EU, which might cause difficulties for the UK

5/

The second big issue is that of keeping numerous balls in the air

6/

While the UK is (rightly) concerned with a number of key issues in Brexit, that doesn't mean it's concerned with all the key issues

7/

Crucially, it's only now that some of the aspects of transition and negotiating the future relationship are coming into political focus, just at the point that the best window of opportunity to shape these is closing

8/

Examples might include mechanisms for extending transition, preparing negotiating structures for the future relationship and legal architectures for that relationship

9/

The danger is that deadlines and crunch points will come, without due reflection and preparation, leading to bad decisions or decisions-by-default, potentially of considerable size and effect

10/

This isn't a call for MOAR BREXIT, but rather a systematic surveying of the entire process through to whatever end-state is anticipated/desired

11/

All this does fall beyond the scope of today's evidence,but it does encompass and inform it

Much to chew on

/end