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The Jeffrey plan being carried to Ankara/Rojava is very complex, requires open-ended commitments from UK-France, Turkish patrols in rural areas, SDF acquiescence, 3rd party forces, and US top cover, perhaps including a US enforced NFZ (unclear if POTUS is on board with this bit)
Whereas, if I am reading Putin’s cryptic statements from the presser accurately (and that is an “if”), Moscow is offering something in line with the Adana Protocol, which, if we all remember 1998, was designed to prevent a Turkish invasion (which did not happen)
The Adana Protocol ascribes responsibility to the Syrian regime (which Turkey does not recognize) to prevent PKK safe-haven and established a hot-line and a diplomatic presence in each country’s missions to oversee. This obviously ended in 2011.
The Adana Protocol *does* include a reference to Turkish right to self defense should Damascus not meet its obligations. But, in the absence of Turkish recognition of Assad, is this still valid? If Putin thinks so, then it's clear he is trying to get the Turks to recognize regime
Which brings us back to the buffer zone concept: One reading of the Moscow meeting is that Russia is pushing for regime return, per the Adana Protocol, while also dangling out cooperation on terrorism. The question, then, becomes if the SDF reaches agreement with Assad...
Are YPG still terrorists in Moscow’s eyes, assuming one component of the agreement is subordination of YPG to some sort of central oversight (however defined)? And, assuming that the US leaves and there are implementation problems with the Jeffrey plan, where does that leave TR?
It is not an easy problem to manage, in fact each side has adopted policies that have obvious flaws — and will require concessions to make work. Question is who will take that first step? My guess is Moscow wants the SDF to subordinate, regime to return. But that is a guess <end>
