It’s a little appreciated fact (in part because it’s counterintuitive) that the more virulent a terrorist group is, the closer US troops need to be to it IOT be effective. Why? Because the US model of CT is one of network targeting. 1/n
This means trying to remove nodes of the network faster than the network can reconstitute itself. If you can consistently do that long enough, you can eventually dismantle a terrorist group (here “consistently” & “long enough” are group-dependent). 2/n
If a group is not particularly resilient (eg disorganized, inexperienced), ops to dismantle the group can be “slower” than ops against a more resilient group (ie, the rate at which you need to remove nodes can be less). Consequently, you can be further away. 3/n
But if a group is strongly resilient, to be effective, your CT forces need to be physically close to that group—so you can act on intelligence quickly, & decrease the time between launch of a raid & actions on target, & retrieval/analysis of materials gathered on target. 4/n
This is also why arguments that the US can conduct CT against #ISIS in #Afghanistan from offshore (eg the Indian Ocean) fall flat. IOT dismantle (or even consistently pressure) a resilient terrorist group, you have to be close. Offshore is too far away to pressure ISIS-K. 6/6
