Thread by @YadlinAmos

Killing Qassem Soleimani, with the blood of hundreds of Americans and Israelis + thousands of Sunni Arabs on his hands, was an act of justice as well as a major blow to Iran’s enterprise of terror and entrenchment across the Middle East.
1/11

For his complacency and arrogance, and for his grave misjudgment of the United States, Soleimani paid with his life. Like his late comrade Mughniyah, Soleimani was an outstanding political leader, military commander, and strategist. I will be difficult for 🇮🇷 to replace him. 2/

The hard to predict Trump, U.S. intel agencies, the Pentagon, and CENTCOM – dealt Iran a blow that was as surprising and shocking as it was severe.
3/11

The Iranians miscalculated on American embassies traumas: from Tehran ‘79 to Benghazi 2012. They mistook a sleeping lion for a dead one.
4/11

It remains to be seen if this change in the US response policy represents a broader change in its policies and strategic priorities towards Iran, terror and the region at large.
5/11

Has finally the US focus shifted from ISIS to IRGC???
Trump now has two Middle Eastern terror chiefs on his belt: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the linchpin of Sunni terrorism, and Qassem Soleimani, the symbol of Shiite terrorism. These are impressive accomplishments in his legacy...6/11

But it is worth remembering that Iran will be forced to respond, perhaps after the 3 days of mourning declared for Soleimani. The targets will either be U.S. forces or U.S. allies, like KSA and Israel.
7/11

For the time being, East Asia and not the Middle East is at the top of the U.S. agenda, but the unfolding events to come may make it hard for it to stay course, and may surely turn as a central issue in the 2020 presidential election.
8/11

Although neither Iran nor the U.S. seek war, they are now both treading on the brink. When it comes to strategic dynamics, one cannot assume that an adversary will stay his past linear course. How things play out will depend on Iran’s response.
9/11

The U.S. strategic challenge is steering between maintaining deterrence achieved, repulsing Iran’s response and escalation control.
Israel is not the most likely target of an Iranian response with its considerable record foiling Iranian attacks and reputation for exacting costs.

U.S forces in the Iraq are more accessible, yet dangerous to provoke. The Saudis may be both more vulnerable and with the lesser potential for retribution against Iran. That being said, it is appropriate to raise Israel’s intel awareness and operational readiness.
11/11