Thread by @HannaNotte

6 months into #Russia’s aggression against #Ukraine, there are mostly losers.

One potential winner is #Turkey, given 2nd-order effects of the war.

Since Feb, Ankara has gained some leverage vis-a-vis both #Russia and #NATO.

An attempt at a (complicated) balance sheet🧵(1/18)

Since Feb, #Turkey has attempted a careful balancing act on #RussiaUkraineWar:
-No sanctions against #Russia
-No boycott of Russian #gas
-#Erdogan engaging #Putin frequently & visibly
-Giving #Ukraine #BayraktarTB2
-Invoking Montreux Convention

I could go on and on (2/18)

As a result of
1) Turkey successfully mediating grain exports from Ukraine ports &
2) #Russia increasingly shunning traditional mediation platforms (Geneva),
Turkey is poised to become chief intermediary on operational issues re #RussiaUkraineWar
un.org/en/black-sea-g… (3/18)

We already see (talk of prospective) Turkish mediation play out on multiple issues:
-#IAEA access to #ZaporizhzhiaNPP,
-prisoner exchanges,
-perhaps localized ceasefires in #Ukraine

https://twitter.com/Amb_Ulyanov/status/1562446685712023552

(4/18)

The result: besides hoping to score points domestically (elections are next year & the economy’s in trouble), #Erdogan underscores Turkey’s centrality to the West and non-West alike. Turkey's enhanced self-confidence manifests in foreign policy moves: (5/18)

Threatening another operation in Northern Syria. Escalation in the Aegean. And being difficult on the accession of #Finland/#Sweden to #NATO, with all eyes on talks today: ft.com/content/957b76… (6/18)

But relative to pre-February #Turkey has also increased its leverage vis #Russia: Though there’s no indication of #Russian withdrawal from #Syria, #Libya, #NagornoKarabakh, Moscow has reduced bandwidth in these theatres, giving #Turkey (& its allies) more room to manoeuvre (7/18)

Indicative of this trend: a more emboldened #Azerbaijan in Karabakh, or Turkish actions in Northern Syria.
But the picture’s complex: #Russia being consumed by #Ukraine also enhances leeway for 3rd actors (eg #Iran), setting in motion complicated 2nd-order dynamics: (8/18)

1) Heightened US/Israeli fears re: Iran’s latitude in #Syria & growing Iran-Russia defense cooperation. Friction between @CENTCOM & Iranian militias in Northeast Syria this week are indicative: centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RE… (9/18)

2) Heightened #Turkey-#Iran competition in the region. However, as @hamidrezaazizi notes👇 this need not play out across the board

https://twitter.com/HamidRezaAz/status/1561819348548964354

And it’s also not like #Russia will fully cede influence to #Iran in Syria.

It'll remain a complex game. (10/18)

I'm not saying #Turkey will now necessarily go against #Russia to pursue its goals. Rumors regarding Turkish normalization with #Assad could be indicative of a receptiveness to dealing with the Kurdish issue through multiple paths.

Probably too early to tell, though (11/18)

Still, the bottom line from #Turkey’s view is this: Enhanced wiggle room -- vis-à-vis #Russia -- in multiple areas beyond the Black Sea. (12/18)

Next: the economic front. Here, the balance sheet for #Turkey is complicated:
Higher food & energy prices due to #RussiaUkraineWar are bad. #Turkey also desperately needs FDI, which #Russia cannot provide. But there’s opportunities: (13/18)

#Turkey fills voids in Russian market left by Western biz. Akkuyu NPP goes ahead. 💰transfers by Rosatom, Turkey paying in RUB for some gas imports & adopting the Mir payment system, appear to be pieces of an effort meant to ease Turkey’s FX crisis (14/18) al-monitor.com/originals/2022…

So, where are we going with all this?
The future of Turkish economic gains & political/military leverage vis-a-vis both #NATO & #Russia will depend on the trajectory of #RussiaUkraineWar -- its longevity & the scope of Russian gains vs losses in #Ukraine. (15/18)

Amid low-level protracted war, there's net gains as described - but they remain contingent on external factors (global economy, 3rd actors).
I'd argue that #Russia either winning in Ukraine (or taking its Black Sea coast) OR suffering a crushing defeat could worry Ankara: (16/18)

On the former scenario, #Turkey doesn't want an expansionist Russia in its neighborhood.

The latter scenario's contingent:
-a “humbled” Russia cutting losses in #Ukraine would be +
-a “humiliated” Russia could be viewed as dangerous (lash out, destabilise internally) (17/18)

Finally, there's the Q of how #Turkey elections will impact all this: A new government would likely take steps to ease friction with US/NATO (eg over S-400), including to ease pressure on the economy, but would not fundamentally alter its approach to #RussiaUkraineWar (18/18)