A thread on the in my view misconceived transition, just agreed between the EU and the UK. My argument is that it fails the EU's own democracy standards, as set in Art 10 TEU ("functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy"). 1/
The UK will no longer be a Member State, but the TEU also says that the Union must uphold its values in its relations with the wider world (Art 3(5)). Does an agreement which asks a third country to comply with all of the acquis comply with this instruction? 2/
Brexiteers may conclude that this constitutes EU bullying. But the UK itself asked for a transition, and did not come with a more detailed proposal. It also insists on leaving the EU by March 2019. So both the EU and the UK are responsible for this. 3/
The EU demand to comply with all of the acquis is entirely understandable, in the absence of an agreement on the future relationship, which could be implemented in a transition. The agreed transition is, effectively, maintaining membership without membership. 4/
There is a much more satisfactory alternative, which does not offend democratic values, and is, in substance, near equivalent. The withdrawal agreement could simply lay down that UK exit takes place on 1 January 2021 rather than March 2019. 5/
UK membership would continue up to that date, with full rights and obligations, but the Brexit date would be agreed and ratified, and therefore be a fact. This would take care of a range of problems bedevilling the current transition. 6/
The UK would continue to participate in EU decision-making. It would continue to benefit from the EU's international agreements. It would co-determine fishing quotas. Etc etc 7/
What could be the objections? First, that the UK has not formally left, in March 2019. But by now everyone knows that the transition is about de facto membership - without representation. 8/
Second, that this cannot legally be done, given the deadline in Article 50. But the text of 50 only refers to this deadline in the absence of a withdrawal agreement. In the interests of an orderly withdrawal, surely the withdrawal agreement can push back the date. 9/
Third, that the UK couldn't negotiate trade agreements as long as it remains a Member State. But there are strong legal arguments (apparently never pushed by the UK) against this view. And the withdrawal agreement could authorise the UK to do this (respecting good faith). 10/
Fourth, that the UK would then need to participate in the EP elections. Again, the withdrawal agreement could make arrangements for this not to be the case. That would limit UK citizen representation in the EU, but this would still be better than no say at all. 11/
This approach would not require any change to the plans of finalising the withdrawal negotiations by October, and getting the withdrawal agreement ratified before March 2019. But it would give a much more acceptable breathing space for the negotiations on future relations. 12/
On overall reflection it seems to me to be a no-brainer that the proposed pushing back of the exit date is much preferable, on all sides, to the transition as currently negotiated.
