Conclusions like this make it necessary to revisit @anandMenon1 piece. The EU bent over backwards to deliver deal UK Govt wanted. @theresa_may failed to get it through Commons. Having spent 3yrs v close to EU side, think it's imp to correct some inaccuracies in @FT piece. Thread
A few days after 2016 Ref, senior German, French & Italian officials met privately in Berlin to caucus their response to Brexit. Besides determining there could be "no negotiations without notification", it was clear then that MS were *very* focussed on LT future relationship 1/
Contrary to Anand's claim that there was an "egregious failure" by MS to think about the LT relationship, for the first several months after Ref, that is, in fact, all they did. What changed? When @MichelBarnier started assembling TF50, they encouraged a different approach 2/
Rather than "eclipsing the substance" as Anand argues, TF50 approach was driven by its fundamental understanding of EU's LT substantive interests: 1) Protect Single Market (as trade among 27 > bilateral trade with UK); 2) Protect risk of precedent (this is not something that.. 3/
EU can afford to be complacent over, even with opinion polls on EU moving in right direction. Salvini in Italy & his friends across EU remain a *medium to long-term challenge*) & 3) Ensure legal certainty for EU at time of UK's exit (MFF; Irish border; & EU nationals in UK) 4/
So yes, @EU_Commission did dominate, but that's because the Cion is best placed to identify & articulate what makes most sense for EU27 in aggregate. It plays similar role in EU's everyday life, albeit imperfectly, cajoling MS to make tough choices that work in interests of Union
On selective access & cherry picking, is it bunkum, as @Raphael_Hogarth & Anand imply, to recognise that SM is an ecosystem that can't easily be picked apart? Fr, Ger & other MS don't trust each other. The reason LPF standards are respected is precisely bc they're overseen by ECJ
This is both a political & legal reality. And surely the UK can't, as a departing MS, expect to have greater influence over EU rules on the outside than it did as a fully signed up MS? Ditto any exceptions to free movement & other 3-freedoms which are an integral part of SM 7/
To compare EU's relationship to Ukraine (which wants to converge), Norway, Switzerland or Iceland (small) as benchmark for UK misses the point. The purpose of Brexit is that the UK Govt wants to diverge. It wants to compete. Why is it in the EU's interests to facilitate that? 8/
The last point I'll make is that post-Chequers, it was the @EU_Commission - not the MS - that ultimately compromised & signed up to a version of May's deal; allowing a defacto CU with minimal, dynamic LPF conditions to be written into the WA. Far from intransigence, these were 9/
V big moves by TF50 to facilitate a deal for @OllyRobbins & @theresa_may. It put @MichelBarnier in a v tough spot with MS, especially the Fr, & highlights a misunderstanding that Anand again echoes: if only Cion would move out of the way, a more sensible deal is there to be done
This is wrong. Why? Because MS have, for most part, been tougher on Brexit than Bxl. The @EU_Commission as the bogeyman caricature doesn't fly. (Neither does idea that Bxl was holding out for 2nd Ref; @eucopresident was, but he was isolated & not reflecting views of capitals) 11/
Perhaps what's worth reflecting on is why we in UK assign an importance to ourselves that EU doesn't see, or perhaps doesn't see to the same extent - in light of its other *strategic* priorities (eg @EmmanuelMacron interview in Economist)? 12/
Just because EU hasn't created an off ramp for the kind of trade & security links the UK would like to maintain is not necessarily an indication of strategic EU myopia, but perhaps our failure to acknowledge our own importance relative to EU's own priorities going forward ENDS
