2/ Turkey’s decision to intervene directly in support of Libya’s UN-recognised gov’t comes in reaction to covert military support offered by Ankara’s Arab rivals and Russia to rebel forces led by General Khalifa Haftar.
3/ Since April, Haftar’s armed groups, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces or LAAF, aided by non-Libyan fighters, military experts and foreign airpower and funds, have been carrying out a military “operation to liberate Tripoli”.
4/ Haftar and his supporters, including Qadhafi-era personalities ousted in 2011 & the parallel East-based gov’t, say they seek to rid Tripoli of militias and unify the Libyan state that has been institutionally divided since 2014.
5/ The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in #Tripoli and its Libyan allies consider this an outright aggression and an attempt to subvert the political order in Libya and impose a return to military rule.
6/ Fighting in Tripoli has been stalemated for months with Haftar making minor gains in November with increased airstrikes.
The war has killed over 2,000 people, including more than 200 civilians, and displaced 200,000 more.
The war has killed over 2,000 people, including more than 200 civilians, and displaced 200,000 more.
7/ In December, Tripoli requested direct military support from 🇺🇸 🇬🇧🇮🇹🇩🇿and 🇹🇷.
But only Ankara agreed.
But only Ankara agreed.
8/ On 2 January, Ankara authorised the military intervention in Libya.
Turkey aims to help Tripoli stop Haftar’s offensive and prevent the collapse of the GNA headed by Prime Minister Serraj.
Turkey aims to help Tripoli stop Haftar’s offensive and prevent the collapse of the GNA headed by Prime Minister Serraj.
9/ Turkish officials hope its military presence will rebalance power on the ground and create the conditions for a ceasefire.
But they also seek to protect geostrategic interests in the Mediterranean Sea, namely a maritime delimitation deal signed with Serraj in December.
But they also seek to protect geostrategic interests in the Mediterranean Sea, namely a maritime delimitation deal signed with Serraj in December.
10/ The maritime deal, which creates an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) , is key to Ankara’s ambition to block an East Med gas pipeline to Europe and disrupt an axis that includes 🇪🇬🇦🇪🇸🇦🇮🇱and some EU countries that seek to contain Turkey in the region.
11/ Would Turkey have intervened so boldly without first securing the maritime deal? Possibly not.
Turkish officials I met in early November showed no sign that they were preoccupied with the military setbacks that Tripoli forces were incurring.
Turkish officials I met in early November showed no sign that they were preoccupied with the military setbacks that Tripoli forces were incurring.
12/ They were instead supportive of the Berlin peace process. They had slowed military supplies to Tripoli in September, which in part led to Tripoli’s military setbacks.
But the maritime deal changed Turkey’s calculations.
But the maritime deal changed Turkey’s calculations.
13/ So far there has been no major Turkish deployment.
Only a few army officers & some new equipment, mainly air defenses, have arrived. Reports suggest fighters from Syrian Free Army have also arrived, although Tripoli denies their presence.
Only a few army officers & some new equipment, mainly air defenses, have arrived. Reports suggest fighters from Syrian Free Army have also arrived, although Tripoli denies their presence.
14/ Nevertheless, pro-GNA personalities remain confident that Turkish military support will make a strategic and military difference.
This has bolstered the feeling that a counteroffensive to push back Haftar forces or even strike them in East Libya is on the cards.
This has bolstered the feeling that a counteroffensive to push back Haftar forces or even strike them in East Libya is on the cards.
15/ This week, GNA forces managed to carry out an airstrike against the Haftar-controlled airport of Wutiya in western Libya.
But mainly the GNA suffered setbacks.
But mainly the GNA suffered setbacks.
16/ An airstrike by Haftar’s forces on a GNA military academy in Tripoli killed 30, further inflaming public rhetoric against Haftar.
After initially taking responsibility, Haftar’s forces denied the strike & blamed terrorists.
After initially taking responsibility, Haftar’s forces denied the strike & blamed terrorists.
17/ On 7 January, Haftar won the coastal city of Sirte in central Libya from the GNA.
The pro-GNA forces from Misrata that were stationed there withdrew without a fight.
The pro-GNA forces from Misrata that were stationed there withdrew without a fight.
18/ The capture of Sirte is the first serious military advance by Haftar’s forces in months.
The surprise is not that he took Sirte, but rather that he waited so long to do so. It is strategically located with vast airbase, and has symbolic status as former Qadhafi stronghold.
The surprise is not that he took Sirte, but rather that he waited so long to do so. It is strategically located with vast airbase, and has symbolic status as former Qadhafi stronghold.
19/ As expected, a Sirte-based armed group called Brigade 604 welcomed Haftar’s arrival. It kept ties to Haftar after a number of its fighters joined his forces in 2015.
Arabic spkers will enjoy a recording the brigade issued explaining their position ⏩ bit.ly/35yZdvD
Arabic spkers will enjoy a recording the brigade issued explaining their position ⏩ bit.ly/35yZdvD
20/ The Turkish build-up, and the takeover of Sirte, highlight two major risks:
➨ Haftar could now move to take Misrata while pro-GNA factions prepare for a counterattack.
➨ Arab nationalist sentiments could ignite a jihad against Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman ambitions”
➨ Haftar could now move to take Misrata while pro-GNA factions prepare for a counterattack.
➨ Arab nationalist sentiments could ignite a jihad against Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman ambitions”
21/ Meanwhile, the UN has renewed calls for de-escalation and for foreign powers to convene in Berlin-hosted talks that it has been pursuing since September last year.
22/ Yesterday – out of the blue – Russian President Putin and Turkish counterpart Erdogan announced a joint call for a ceasefire in Libya starting this Sunday as well as their support for political negotiations.
23/ While calls for a ceasefire are always welcome, some questions remain:
➨ Were there consultations with Libyan partners?
➨ Is the ceasefire unconditional or will it follow the withdrawal of forces?
➨ Are other regional Haftar-backers on board?
➨ Were there consultations with Libyan partners?
➨ Is the ceasefire unconditional or will it follow the withdrawal of forces?
➨ Are other regional Haftar-backers on board?
24/ Sources in Tripoli are still confident that Turkey will not sell them out. They say Ankara remains supportive of their demands for Haftar to withdraw to the pre-April positions and be excluded from political talks.
In any case, they vow to fight on.
In any case, they vow to fight on.
25/ Haftar’s forces have shown no sign of supporting the ceasefire, at least so far.
In apparent defiance, they yesterday declared a no-fly zone over Western Libya, including Tripoli airport Meitiga. Talk of their continuing advance to Tripoli is still in air. [continues]
In apparent defiance, they yesterday declared a no-fly zone over Western Libya, including Tripoli airport Meitiga. Talk of their continuing advance to Tripoli is still in air. [continues]
26/ Egypt reacted coldly to the Turkish-Russian announcement.
Cairo and Moscow have close military ties, but 🇪🇬 has its own set of geopolitical and counterterrorism priorities in 🇱🇾. It is unlikely to remain passive in the face of a TU-RU deal, if it goes against its interests.
Cairo and Moscow have close military ties, but 🇪🇬 has its own set of geopolitical and counterterrorism priorities in 🇱🇾. It is unlikely to remain passive in the face of a TU-RU deal, if it goes against its interests.
27/ TU-RU’s call for a ceasefire is more a statement of intent rather than a deal that is certain to materialise.
But whether this will be respected or not, closer cooperation between Moscow & Ankara could enable both to scale down their involvement and avoid further escalation
But whether this will be respected or not, closer cooperation between Moscow & Ankara could enable both to scale down their involvement and avoid further escalation
28/ What all sides need to watch out for at this point is how Cairo and Washington react.
A scheduled meeting between the US delegation & Haftar is taking place today.
A scheduled meeting between the US delegation & Haftar is taking place today.
29/ To sum up, Libya remains in a state of uncertainty. The risk of escalation remains real, as intersecting geopolitical interests collide and the chances of persuading the parties to go to the negotiating table remain relatively low.
But always, inshallah kheir. 1/29
But always, inshallah kheir. 1/29
