Today’s robust #inflation data surprised in its strength and will likely persist in the short-run, and in some areas the intermediate-term, although we think that long-term the @federalreserve is largely correct in identifying real #economy price gains as mostly #transitory.
Much of today’s #inflation is due to reopening factors and supply constraints, but as #SupplyChains normalize from Covid-related shocks and #inventories rebuild, we expect much of the recent inflation will be transitory, with some stickiness in pricing pressure longer-run.
That may be especially the case where #inventory levels are harder to build up quickly and continued #demand from higher levels of #growth persist for at least the next year, or so.
With respect to today’s #inflation data, #coreCPI (ex. volatile food and energy components) came in strongly at 0.9% m-o-m and 4.5% y-o-y, above the consensus forecast and again driven higher by used vehicle prices, which rose by 10.5% on the month to hit a 45% gain y-o-y.
In our view, the question of #inflation’s “stickiness” will ultimately depend on the elasticity of supply for goods and services, but in the long run the aggregate #SupplyCurve has been extremely flexible and dynamic, even for #labor.
Hence, we believe it is hard to see a case for the current levels of elevated #inflation turning into “1970s style” runaway #price increases, but where does today’s data leave the #Fed’s policy reaction function?
We’ve argued that policy adjustments that are intentionally late, as the #Fed’s #AverageInflationTargeting goals may end up being, can create distortions in the #economy and #markets that (ironically) risk undermining the very successes that policy has achieved.
Therefore, we think the #Fed should adjust #MonetaryPolicy away from emergency conditions, as this is now distorting the economy and markets, particularly in #housing.
Indeed, purchasing $40 billion a month of Agency #mortgages at inflated prices only continues to overheat a #housing market that is beset by extremely low inventory and consequently surging prices (lower levels of #affordability).
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On the #market lessons stemming from the pandemic, I suggested that- stepping back- while a lot has been thrown at the #economy and markets over the past 30 years, in every case the #policy response has been critical to evaluate in judging the ultimate impact: policy matters!
That said, we think there is an overestimation of the importance of exceedingly low #policy rate levels to the recovery but maintaining the stability and #liquidity of the financing #markets is critical, particularly at the top end of the capital stack.
At yesterday’s #FOMC meeting, the Committee revealed more expected tightening and further steps toward #tapering#asset purchases than they had previously. We see these as steps in the right direction.
Yesterday’s @federalreserve statement and press conference suggest that the Committee believes progress has been made toward its goals, but that there’s still some room to go to hit the recently re-defined objective of maximum #employment.
Still, it’s now time to set up for the end of this long-running #EmergencyPolicy-focused movie.
In our latest @BlackRock Market Insights commentary we argue that #inflation’s role in the #economic order can be misinterpreted, and therefore that #policy seeking to achieve positive ends can ironically become the means by which those ends are undone: bit.ly/3fyLn4O
Today, policymakers face a set of increasingly critical choices that could end up shaping our quality of life for a generation. Changes to the #Fed’s #inflation framework, without being fully debated, may ironically end up exacerbating the very problems they seek to alleviate.
One might paraphrase the #Fed mandate of full employment and stable prices as being intended “to preserve the purchasing power of as many as possible” – or, to create the best quality of life for the community. So, how do varying levels of #inflation impact that mandate?
The #economy and #markets today present us with a type of confusing environment: a tremendous growth rebound amid concerns over different forms of #overheating due to policy being late to normalize, and then the uncertainty of an ultimately harsher policy unwind down the road…
… It’s in this kind of environment that we find that what #investors want to do can be very different from what they need to do – the opposite, or mirror image, in fact: bit.ly/3u0nmr9
Over the last decade, the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High Yield Index has traded in a #yield range of about 4% to 12%, and both those extremes have come during the pandemic period (the last 14 months).
While our February 18th monthly client call argument for rising #RealRates appeared prescient, we were surprised by the magnitude of last week’s #move and would expect a more benign evolution toward #equilibrium going forward.
Taking a stab at periodizing the past year: 1) in Feb/Mar 2020 the Covid crisis was priced into #markets, real #rates spiked higher, #inflation breakevens collapsed and #investors scrambled to raise #cash as the #SPX experienced its fastest 30% drawdown in history.
Then, 2) from Apr through Oct 2020 we witnessed the #market impact of monumental #monetary and #fiscal policy responses to the #crisis, as policymakers successfully sought to force #real rates down and restore #inflation expectations.
Second, @RobertJShiller published a significant update to his widely followed #CAPE model: subtracting the real #yield on #USTs from the reciprocal of the CAPE ratio to show what an #equity#investor may expect to earn over #risk-free #bonds, in real terms based on #market price.