In our latest @BlackRock Market Insights commentary we argue that #inflation’s role in the #economic order can be misinterpreted, and therefore that #policy seeking to achieve positive ends can ironically become the means by which those ends are undone: bit.ly/3fyLn4O
Today, policymakers face a set of increasingly critical choices that could end up shaping our quality of life for a generation. Changes to the #Fed’s #inflation framework, without being fully debated, may ironically end up exacerbating the very problems they seek to alleviate.
One might paraphrase the #Fed mandate of full employment and stable prices as being intended “to preserve the purchasing power of as many as possible” – or, to create the best quality of life for the community. So, how do varying levels of #inflation impact that mandate?
On one hand, #prices that are falling too quickly have the potential to hurt purchasing power by raising the real value and servicing cost of #liabilities, and on the other, prices that are rising too quickly can hurt #PurchasingPower by reducing the real value of #income.
And both these extremes can be detrimental to #psychology and #economic decision making.
Not all #price changes impact purchasing power the same way, but in aggregate, there is a healthy middle ground that allows for a sustainable #debt load while also supporting the quality-of-life-enhancing process of #CreativeDestruction.
On the back of a blockbuster April #inflation report that hinted at #overheating, the question of what constitutes that healthy middle ground, and whether it needs to be above 2% or not (@federalreserve policymakers tend to believe that it does), has never been more important.
In our view, growing #demand, or expanding #investment, are typically supportive of quality of life improvements, an idea that likely draws little argument.
Considerably more debatable though, is a theory that #inflation proponents often peddle, stating that higher levels of inflation foster #growth and incentivize expansionary investment.
Yet, we think there is a “leap of logic” embedded in that theory; an incredibly important nuance that must be isolated and understood: #inflation is a consequence of demand, not a catalyst for it!
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The #economy and #markets today present us with a type of confusing environment: a tremendous growth rebound amid concerns over different forms of #overheating due to policy being late to normalize, and then the uncertainty of an ultimately harsher policy unwind down the road…
… It’s in this kind of environment that we find that what #investors want to do can be very different from what they need to do – the opposite, or mirror image, in fact: bit.ly/3u0nmr9
Over the last decade, the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High Yield Index has traded in a #yield range of about 4% to 12%, and both those extremes have come during the pandemic period (the last 14 months).
While our February 18th monthly client call argument for rising #RealRates appeared prescient, we were surprised by the magnitude of last week’s #move and would expect a more benign evolution toward #equilibrium going forward.
Taking a stab at periodizing the past year: 1) in Feb/Mar 2020 the Covid crisis was priced into #markets, real #rates spiked higher, #inflation breakevens collapsed and #investors scrambled to raise #cash as the #SPX experienced its fastest 30% drawdown in history.
Then, 2) from Apr through Oct 2020 we witnessed the #market impact of monumental #monetary and #fiscal policy responses to the #crisis, as policymakers successfully sought to force #real rates down and restore #inflation expectations.
Second, @RobertJShiller published a significant update to his widely followed #CAPE model: subtracting the real #yield on #USTs from the reciprocal of the CAPE ratio to show what an #equity#investor may expect to earn over #risk-free #bonds, in real terms based on #market price.
The turn of the calendar year invites the temptation to prognosticate regarding the course of the year ahead for the #economy and for #markets, and not being immune to that impulse, here are our views on the “11 themes to consider as we look toward 2021:” bit.ly/386mb0r
In preview, one key theme is that 2021’s nominal #GDP growth is likely to surprise many skeptics with its strength. The sources of upside surprise can be found in: 1) the new #fiscal#stimulus combined with structural budget #deficits…
And in 2) the @federalreserve’s ongoing asset purchases and 3) the impressive #economic momentum that is still broadly underestimated, as a post-election, and #pandemic-recovering world can catalyze 2020/21’s monetized #stimulus (more than 15% of GDP) into impressive NGDP growth.
As we head into the U.S. #election, there will continue to be a lot of noise that may lead to near-term #market#volatility, particularly since (as we’ve long argued) #markets appear to be able to only focus on one thing at a time!
Still, at times like this it’s crucial to focus on more consequential factors that will drive #markets in the years ahead: in this case, the powerful combination of @federalreserve#monetarypolicy and #fiscal rescue measures intended to keep the #economic engine on track.
So, while many will continue to be skeptical of the sustainability of this #economic recovery, we’ve been impressed by its strength, particularly in the #interest-rate-sensitive segments of the #economy, like #housing, which is going through the roof!
Many #investors will be focusing on the #PresidentialDebates, which begin tonight, but while there are quite meaningful #policy differences between the parties, ongoing structural #deficits are likely to exist regardless of who wins in November.
Further, to the extent that these #deficits are #monetized by the @federalreserve, then significant increases in #money supply could drive nominal #GDP growth for a time, even in the absence of new fiscal initiatives.
Also, we’re skeptical of the arguments that fret over a #FiscalCliff, since the @USCBO estimates that even with no further #stimulus measures, the U.S. will have a #deficit of 8.5% of #GDP for fiscal 2021.