Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #IranTalks
Most recents (17)
🧵In my latest piece for @WashInstitute, I take a look at how the US could increase pressure on Iranian energy exports, in light of Tehran's support for Russia in Ukraine, domestic suppression, and nuclear advances.
In short: US is not "sanctioned out."
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
In short: US is not "sanctioned out."
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
Iran's crude + condensate exports over past 3 months were 810,000-1.2m bpd, according to data from @TankerTrackers, @Vortexa, @Kpler & @UANI.
That's much lower than pre-Trump withdrawal from JCPOA, when exports topped 2.7m. But they're higher than at peak of max pressure, ~500k.
That's much lower than pre-Trump withdrawal from JCPOA, when exports topped 2.7m. But they're higher than at peak of max pressure, ~500k.
Biden admin did not rigorously enforce oil sanctions in word or deed, prioritizing diplomatic efforts to revive JCPOA.
But this was likely counterproductive: Lack of enforcement may have weakened Iran's urgency to get a deal & reduced a deal's marginal benefits.
But this was likely counterproductive: Lack of enforcement may have weakened Iran's urgency to get a deal & reduced a deal's marginal benefits.
🧵(1/ 20) Thoughts on the #US / #Saudi relationship ILO @OPECSecretariat decision: There’s a marked elite / citizenry divide in the US over the relationship: popular opinion is asserting itself in a way neither side wants. 
(2/20) First, important to note that no-one in the #USA who doesn’t work on #saudi issues has been positive towards the regime there. It’s a monarchy, it denies basic human rights, it is based on extracted wealth (discovered by Americans).
(3/20) Pick your reason why: racism, Protestant Work Ethic, dissimilar political systems, diff. values. Any explanation works equally well. (I discussed in a chapter here.) Bottom Line: there is no reservoir of good will for KSA in USA. routledge.com/The-Arab-Gulf-…
A couple of new tidbits on #IranTalks. My understanding is that while #Iran is seeking a change to the safeguards text the EU offered, that's mainly on intended date to close probe by Confirmation Day. It is not explicitly seeking upfront guarantee that probe will be closed. -1-
Separately, my understanding is that all excess centrifuges of type mentioned as permissible in deal (IR-1, IR-2, IR-2M, IR-4/6/8) will be removed and kept under seal whole. Only the experimental centrifuges of other types (IR-9s) will be effectively dismantled.-2-
Also interesting: @iaeaorg will only have 60 days (confirmation day to reimplementation day) to examine 18+ months of camera footage and monitoring data from Iran that they didn't receive since Feb 2021. And reconstruct what happened at facilities where cameras removed in June-3-
THREAD
1)
#Iran opposition @NCRIUS Rep. Office held a conference on Aug 17 with US/European dignitaries on Iran’s nuclear program 20 years after revelations of the regime’s nuclear sites & the failed Obama/Biden policies.
#Natanz20
First, some history.
1)
#Iran opposition @NCRIUS Rep. Office held a conference on Aug 17 with US/European dignitaries on Iran’s nuclear program 20 years after revelations of the regime’s nuclear sites & the failed Obama/Biden policies.
#Natanz20
First, some history.
2)
Sen. @JoeLieberman
"We ought to talk away from the negotiations in Vienna... We tried engagement. We continue to repeat the same thing with the same awful result."
#IranTalks
#Natanz20
Sen. @JoeLieberman
"We ought to talk away from the negotiations in Vienna... We tried engagement. We continue to repeat the same thing with the same awful result."
#IranTalks
#Natanz20
@JoeLieberman 3)
Sen. @JoeLieberman
There was bipartisan pressure from the U.S. on #Iran’s nuclear program until 2015 when the Obama admin threw away all that for nothing, on a belief they could contain the mullahs’ regime.
#Natanz20
Sen. @JoeLieberman
There was bipartisan pressure from the U.S. on #Iran’s nuclear program until 2015 when the Obama admin threw away all that for nothing, on a belief they could contain the mullahs’ regime.
#Natanz20
A brief #irantalks reflection: With benefit of some hindsight and (incomplete) information, it’s become clearer that two of the key assumptions undergirding the IRGC FTO debate earlier this spring were wrong or, at best, incomplete.
(1/9)
(1/9)
(1) Iran would not accept a deal that didn't include FTO removal.
--It was a "red line" & "must have."
--IRGC's heft within the Iranian system meant negotiators had no room to move.
--Tehran wasn't likely to blink, and the US would have to remove it if it wanted a deal.
(2/9)
--It was a "red line" & "must have."
--IRGC's heft within the Iranian system meant negotiators had no room to move.
--Tehran wasn't likely to blink, and the US would have to remove it if it wanted a deal.
(2/9)
Based on the latest reports from the negotiations, Iran has backed off the FTO demand, and Iranian media and officials have tried to reframe the issue as one that could be addressed in the future.
The supposedly immutable Iranian position shifted substantially.
(3/9)
The supposedly immutable Iranian position shifted substantially.
(3/9)
Just Ran: US says Russia should back down on written guarantees sanctions demand in #IranTalks or they'll seek alternative agreement with Iran, excluding Moscow. wsj.com/articles/u-s-w… -1-
A senior State Department official said if #Russia presses its guarantee demands or doesn’t reply “in the coming week,” Washington would need to “very quickly consider an alternative path.” -2-
U.S. official says would need to quickly explore an alternative deal if Russia won't back down, given pressing time constraints. Too early to say if that would be interim deal or a JCPOA replica. At this point, "wouldn’t rule anything out.” -3-
Quick 🧵 on Russia's sabotage of the #IranTalks in Vienna.
Though the JCPOA has not been killed by the Russian demands, Moscow does have the ability to harm the US by delaying the agreement at a crucial point of US vulnerability to high oil prices. >>
Though the JCPOA has not been killed by the Russian demands, Moscow does have the ability to harm the US by delaying the agreement at a crucial point of US vulnerability to high oil prices. >>
2. Russia can possibly also pull the plug on the agreement as a whole by triggering snap-back sanctions in the UN Security Council or preventing the Joint Commission to adopt the decision to bring the US back into the deal. >>
3. In retrospect, the parties were clearly mistaken in thinking that Russia would continue to compartmentalize the JCPOA talks from its tensions with the West. It remains unclear however if the Russian objective is to delay the deal or to scuttle the deal.
>>
>>
My understanding now of any #IranTalks deal that emerges is several phases of implementation. There will 1/ be a “confirmation” period. That could mean for Majlis and INARA? Not quite clear. Then 2/ A preparation period. (IAEA get material to review?) 3/ we then get... 1/2
Re-implementation day. And then 4/ we get some period for final steps by Iran on nuclear side as I understand it. Total period a few months and aim to do by summer. BUT I understand discussions remain on precise sequencing steps and length. -2-
All this raises a few questions. When would “verification” be? How many steps to return to compliance will Iran/US have taken by June when we find out if IAEA is shutting or keeping open the safeguards probe? When does IAEA get docs and material from Iran? Do US hold off final-3-
#IranTalks: Let's not underestimate significance of @rafaelmgrossi Tehran trip. Let's assume it succeeds, which is definitely an assumption. But if so, it removes probably the toughest of the three remaining issues on the table. Then we can imagine a quick pathway to deal.
-1-
-1-
At that point, we have 2 issues essentially. Economic guarantee push from Iran & sanctions scope push. Econ guarantees was worked on for weeks. Iran knows not going to get much more than pretty words. Maybe it gets a few more pretty words. But won't change US legal reality -2-
On the other hand, we know Iran wants unconditional FTO removal from IRGC & I suspect a few other key demands on sanctions. There's a potential (STRESS POTENTIAL) trade-off here. Back off on economic guarantees, US gives a bit more on sanctions. -3-
Managed to check in with several sources tonight. This is where I think we stand on #IranTalks and some key points...
1 -- Diplos genuinely don't know which way this is going, Most still think this could come together but confidence levels on this are low. The differences that were there on Monday when Bagheri-Kani returned are still there -- safeguards, sanctions scope, economic guarantees.
2 -- Ukraine/Russia has landed in talks in several ways. A: Russia team more tentative about clearing ideas without checking. B, it hardens the idea that diplomatic window to land this deal is short. C/ Optics of sitting down with Russia on this getting more complicated in DC.
Senior EU diplomat: #IranTalks "I expect an agreement very soon. Ideally yes, I expect an agreement in the coming week or ***coming two weeks or so***." -1-
"Most of the issues are already agreed. But as a principle in this kind of negotiations, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. So we still have...some questions, some of them rather political and difficult to agree." -2-
"Over the last 2 weeks, delegations have shown a lot of political will. It's clear that they want a compromise. It's clear that all delegations around the table -and that which is not around the table but it's around the corner, the United States - it also wants an agreement."-3-
Watch Live Now
.@A_Jafarzadeh: We need to deal with firmness to this regime. It should be granted no sanctions relief. It is imperative to reinstate all UNSC resolutions.
#Iran
twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1…
#Iran
twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1…
@A_Jafarzadeh .@A_Jafarzadeh: We’re revealing for the first time a number of IRGC front companies running the regime’s drone program. These companies have civilian names but are in service of the IRGC. They are doing what the IRGC can’t do itself
#UAV #JCPOA
twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1…
#UAV #JCPOA
twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1…
Some thoughts on #IranTalks and the issue of guarantees. I've had a few days to speak to western sources to get their take on the role disagreement over guarantees that the U.S. not again withdraw from JCPOA played in stalling Vienna talks.-1-
First, an acknowledgement that different sources always have slightly different takes and perceptions and the caveat that since the Iranians wouldn't speak to the U.S. directly, some misunderstandings of each other's positions and expectations was inevitable. -2-
Second, my understanding is that the central factual claim made by @tparsi -- that Iran lowered its demand from insisting on a permanent guarantee that the U.S. not exit the JCPOA to insisting on a legal guarantee that the Biden administration not exit the deal -- is correct. -3-
So as another week of #IranTalks is chalked up, here's my feed of the latest from sources. There has been very little progress at all on core issues. One senior source went so far as to say that "nothing is really happening" in the talks, constructive though atmosphere remains-1-
Others a tad more specific that there has been some progress on the language of what's being drafted for return to compliance texts -- language that matters but very much on the details not the core issues. -2-
Strikingly, one area all my sources are agreed on is that the Israel-Palestinian escalation has not affected the talks or the atmosphere. Some will lament that. But it was as true in 2014 with Russia's Ukraine intervention as with the last Gaza escalation that year. These -3-
Some thoughts on where we are ok #IranTalks based around various sources. Last week’s discussions really made no progress. Two fundamental problems. 1/ the indirect talks are badly slowing things down. Decisions that could be made quickly are taking much longer and lack of -1-
clarity of what precise positions and potential trade offs on offer are because not in same room. 2/ as @BarakRavid has reported, on the nuclear side Iran has stepped up demands. And it’s offering no clarity of what it will do when on the difficult things. As a result...
there is a growing sense that striking a full deal by mid May or by May 21 IAEA-Iran agreement is very unlikely on western side. That is leading again to exploring ideas of a political agreement/framework to hold what progress there’s been in place before end May and then -3-
#International_Campaign to Demand the Dropping of Unfounded Charges against #Mohammad_Moghimi
vimeo.com/131931613
vimeo.com/131931613
@PahlaviReza #irantalks @UN @USAdarFarsi @BarackObama @fhollande @LaurentFabius @David_Cameron @AngelaMerkelAra @MartinSchulz @hrw
@UNrightswire @hrw @shaheedsr
