Thread by @nicholadrummond

WHAT IS WRONG WITH UK DEFENCE ACQUISITION?
I want to provide a few perspectives about equipment procurement. I will focus on Land Systems since this my area of expertise. I’ll try and cover the essential points, but others will provide more. Here goes...
1/14

The core problem is that we always want the gold plated solution, not the 90% solution. To use @thinkdefence ‘s well-worn trope: we have champagne tastes but a beer budget. Sometimes we low-ball new kit coss just so it passes scrutiny and then plead unavoidable cost growth.
2/14

As a result, we have created an institutionalised tension between the Treasury and MoD. The former thinks the latter cannot be trusted to set a budget that is adhered to. Meanwhile, the MoD sees budget setting as an all-out battle with other Govt. departments.
3/14

Before the Cold War ended, the UK would pay Prime Contractors to develop and produce bespoke bits of kit. Challenger, Warrior, CVR(T) and SA80 are examples of this. Gradually, the process has become unaffordable. So we were forced to start buying stuff off-the-shelf.
4/14

The problem is we don’t buy of the shelf. We find something we like and then spend extra £££ customising it around our unique needs. This creates design risk, integration risk and testing risk. Ajax is a good example of this. So is Bowman. Maybe Type 31 will be different.
5/14

Sometimes we have to add extra utility. But we seem to specify too much customised content. Worse still, we add or change the agreed specifications after the contract has been signed. This adds risk, kills the original timeline and allows suppliers to charge much more.
6/14

Increasingly, lead times are so long and threats evolve so quickly, we need to start upgrading kit almost at the point at which it enters service. To avoid this concern, we then specify immature technologies that aren’t ready, don’t work and need to be changed at extra cost.
7/14

Another issue is that those involved in the acquisition process may have no military experience, so aren’t qualified to make judgement calls on what bits really matter. It is a grave mistake to specify separate sub-components instead of going with complete proven systems.
8/14

The MoD doesn’t have enough ex-military personnel involved in acquisition. Serving personnel bring great value to the procurement process, but, with two-year rotations, they leave a programme just as they become essential to its success.
9/14

As someone who read law at Cambridge, I‘m not convinced the UK MoD is particularly good at contract negotiation or enforcement. I see too many suppliers whose contracts should be rescinded for non-performance. Paradoxically, the MoD is sometimes the cause of their failure.
10/14

Another problem in the Land Domain is that we no longer seem able to run competitive tenders. MIV and MRVP Package 1, Apache E, P-8 Poseidon and Protector UAV were all billion £ programmes run without a competition.
11/14

Our inability to control costs as programmes move from the demonstration phase to main gate, often means that we delay or slow down production. This reduces short-term cost but overall programme costs mushroom. The carriers and F-35 are good examples. We have to stop this.
12/14

Having said all this, don’t think for a moment that the MoD is totally inept. It is not. It is full of extremely capable engineers, project managers and experienced ex-service personnel. The problem is not the people but the culture. It needs a new vision and processes.
13/14

Much of what I describe, has already been identified and is in the process of being fixed. I have great confidence in the people responsible for making key decisions. Yes, further change is needed, but we shouldn’t ignore the progress already made.
14/END