Something to watch following the assassination of Soleimani: U.S. relations with Malaysia. The relationship between Iran and Malaysia is broad and deep. How deep? Some examples:
Soleimani’s daughter, Nargis, was living in Malaysia in 2013, according to Dexter Filkins’ authoritative profile of him. He was said to be worried about her lifestyle. 
Nargis would have been in good company. There is a large Iranian presence in Malaysia, which is the rare country to offer Iranians visa free entry (for 14 days). Iranian officials estimate around 4,000 Iranian students study in Malaysia.
Malaysian defence minister Mat Sabu has close ties to Iran. (His opponents say this is because he is secretly Shia, which would be illegal in Malaysia and is a charge he denies: sg.news.yahoo.com/ministry-revea…).
During the 1990s, Iranian officials and Hezbollah operatives were active in Malaysia, recruiting agents, fundraising, and planning attacks. From @Levitt_Matt:
Some of this activity may have continued. Last year, a Hamas rocket scientist was assassinated, allegedly by Israeli agents, in Kuala Lumpur. Western intelligence told @haaretzcom that Malaysia had once again ‘become a hub for Iranian activity.’ haaretz.com/middle-east-ne….
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad hosted Iranian President Hassan Rouhani just two weeks ago in Kuala Lumpur, and has complained that U.S. sanctions against Iran — which have prompted the closure of Iranian bank accounts in Malaysia — are illegal: benarnews.org/english/news/m….
Anwar Ibrahim has long expressed admiration for the Iranian revolution. He has noted that he led the second delegation to visit Khomeini after the Iranian revolution — after Yasser Arafat — when he was head of Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM).
Anecdotally, in speaking with Malaysian contacts today, many who are normally favorably disposed to the United States have expressed admiration for Iran and shock at Soleimani’s assassination.
Many other analysts have noted that a conflict in the Middle East is likely to be a distraction from U.S. competition with China and the Trump Administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS): .
But the strike could also make U.S. diplomacy in the region more difficult in other ways, as well — as the Iraq war did for many years — by making cooperation with the U.S. more unpopular and by undermining U.S. narratives about international law.
Seeing a bit of this in the replies, so thought I would address it as part of the thread. You’re right about non-alignment, and I am not suggesting Malaysia is categorically pro-Iran or anti-American. Malaysian ties to the US are also close and deep. (1/2)
But there is a misperception in the US that Iran is isolated and has few friends around the world, or that South and East Asian states will shrug this off. I don’t think that’s the case, especially in Malaysia, and it’s worth highlighting for my (mostly American) audience. (2/2)
