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1/ In addition to the daring choice of title, this policy paper lacks crucial basic assumptions about the current situation in #Syria and thus suggests that there may be a more reasonable alternative to the #EU's sanctions policy against the regime.
ecfr.eu/publications/s…
ecfr.eu/publications/s…
2/ The final note emphasizes that the interviews are intended to highlight the views of people from the territories held by the regime, but doesnt make a clear distinction between the opinion of Assad loyalists, who gain clear advantage of Assad's rule
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasou…
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasou…
3/ & the opinion of people who, due to the existential hardship in the opposition areas & the fear of a brutal war of attrition, have found their way into these areas. A choice which is accompanied by an as-if loyalty to ensure the safety of one's own life atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasou…
4/ The author refers to the anti-coruption attempts of the notorious regime supporter Fares Shehabi, who was the head of the corrupt chamber of commerce in Aleppo and is trying to get rid of his economic competitors with such an effort against corruption. 
5/ Thereby the author underestimates the functions of individuals like Shehabi in the performance of populist authoritarianism, which tries to generate popular support through government responsiveness to corruption, in order to ensure regime sutainability oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/a…
6/ With the analysis of Tehran's intention in Syria, the paper completely dispenses with a consideration of the sectarian composition of the central positions of power of the Assad regime, but refers to the great portion of Sunnis in the Syrian state institutions
7/ The reference to the asymmetrical distribution of power on the basis of sectarian origin within these institutions is completely omitted, which is decisive info for describing the structures of power, esp. regarding the regimes relationship towards Iran
8/ Teheran is more likely to be given a passive role as a supporter. The assertion that #Iran is not interested in an active policy of shaping the demographic composition of some areas in #Syria remains without empirical evidence. syria.chathamhouse.org/research/iran-…
9/ This conclusion fails to recognize the intended policy of systematic displacement to change the demographic composition of some territories in #Syria, which is supported by Tehran to control strategically important areas for regional influence. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasou…
10/ However, the conclusion about the role of the sanctioned businessmen in the violence in #Syria, who are known to serve as capital for the regime's war machine or directly maintain their own militias, is the most questionable part. international-review.org/assad-or-we-bu…
11/ With regard to the symbiosis of regime & business world as well as the indispensable dependence of the latter towards Assads rule, it is very difficult to identify who is a trustworthy partner regarding economic rapprochement or reconstruction brookings.edu/research/beyon…
12/ The argument that Syrians would rather pursue a life in dignity under Assad to meet their existential needs contradicts w/ the fact that this economy was a main driving factor of the uprising & rather illustrates the degree of authoritarian subjectivation in the population.
13/ Contrary to the author's believe that easing the sanctions against the regime could lead to a political transition or that the #EU could thereby initiate any chance of political shaping, a crucial question should be raised regarding the claim, that sanctions were useless.
14/ Do sanctions not have the desired effect? If you want to think only in terms of maximum goals, with certainty. However, it should be asked how many ppl the regime would have killed without sanctions? How much more ruthless would the regime have been in recaptured territories?
15/ The sanctions against Russia for its involvement in the Ukraine crisis, led to Russia being forced to withdraw its maximum objective and thus into a negotiating position. Similar patterns can be seen with the Assad regime. foreignaffairs.com/articles/russi…
16/ Is a partial reduction of the sanctions against the Assad regime as well as its cronies in the interest of a realistic policy choice of the European Community and the ordinary Syrian? Here you can formulate some counter-questions:
17/ If the #EU sees itself as a community with values based on liberal assumptions, can cooperation with a totalitarian state that has overrun every need for political change with absolute annihilation, be in the interest of self-preservation of the EU? fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/dkelemen/resea…
18/ Does the access for an economic recovery of Assads inner circle not offer a clear signal for other authoritarian regimes, that a brutal counterrevolution is not only feasible, but is also rewarded afterwards in economic terms by the international community?
19/ Does this reorientation really support the ordinary Syrian in his dignity if he is given the opportunity to consume in a monopolised market, but at the same time continues to be exposed to the kleptocratic behaviour of an arbitrary ruler?
20/ Does the severe abuse of humanitarian aid by the regime in cooperation with co-opted civil society organizations not already show empirically how intransparent and uncontrollable this cooperation with the regime is? onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.100…
21/ Can the rule of violence be curbed by normalising economic policy? While the attacks in #Idlib demonstrates the will of Assad to show the absolute expression of his authority, the ordinary Syrian in post-conflict #Syria will die in his dungeons again. nytimes.com/2019/05/11/wor…
22/ The fusion of regime and business is the central pillar of authoritarian persistence in #Syria, so it is the fuel of its war machine and so it is part of the ubiquitous violence that has brought the ordinary Syrian into this existential plight.
23/ There is only one peace to make with Assad & that is an authoritarian peace, where the regime decides on the state of emergency & also ends it. Concessions & political changes are decisions of the cartel. A consequence that cannot be in the sense of a reasonable EU policy.
