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On July 3, 1979, #JimmyCarter signed two Presidential Findings for Afghanistan, marking the beginning of the United States’ program to covertly support the anti-government insurgents. #Afghanistan1979 
The first Finding provided authorization to “support insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establish radio access to the Afghan population through third country facilities;” and ...
... “provide unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to Afghan insurgents, either in the form of cash or non-military supplies.”
The second Finding provided authorization to “expose the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its leadership as despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union” and to “publicize efforts by the Afghan insurgents to regain their country’s sovereignty.”
These documents can be found in #JimmyCarterLibrary, Staff Offices, Counsel’s Office (Cutler), Box 60, folder: “CIA Charter: 2/9-25/80.”
Under the directives, CIA was authorized to expend up to $695,000, which was used to transfer cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters to the ISI in Pakistan, who then distributed them to Afghan exiles along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
This covert action program (and the fact that Carter’s directives pre-dated the Soviet invasion by some five months) remained officially secret until it was disclosed first by Chief of CIA’s Near East South Asia Division Chuck Cogan in an article in 1993. jstor.org/stable/4020930…
Then—in a much higher profile publication—Robert M. Gates’ 1996 memoirs “From the Shadows” also detailed the program (p. 146)
In a controversial interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur published in January 1998, Brzezinski confirmed Cogan and Gates’ revelations:
Brzezinski recounted that “according to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But …
… the reality, kept secret until now, is quite different: Indeed, it was on July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.”
He was further quoted alleging that “on that day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention.”
Brzezinski admitted that the administration had “knowingly increased the probability” that the Soviets would intervene, and maintained that the “secret operation was an excellent idea” as it “had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.”
He added that on the “day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, in essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its own Vietnam War.”
Finally, he boasted that “for almost ten years, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for the regime, a conflict that led to the demoralization and ultimately the breakup of the Soviet empire.”
This interview (along with the circumstantial fact that the covert action program predating the Soviet invasion) has bred an “Afghan trap” thesis that contends that the Carter administration sought to induce the invasion in order to trap Moscow in its own Vietnam-like quagmire.
It has also been used to blame the United States for the resulting destabilization of Afghanistan and for arming the militant Islamic fundamentalists who defeated one superpower only to attack another on 9/11.
There are, however, a number of problems with the interview that need to be borne in mind: Brzezinski has denied the accuracy of the translation and editing of the interview, which was never submitted to him for approval in advance of publication; ...
Many of the claims are unsupported by documentary evidence (especially the note to Carter on July 3); and nowhere else has Brzezinski ever referred to a systematic plan for an “Afghan trap”; ...
The covert action planning process, Brzezinski’s own actions through 1979, and his post-invasion memos to Carter belie the idea that a Soviet invasion was something that was desirable from an American point of view; ...
And as @JustinVaisse points out in his recent biography of Brzezinski, the title of the article is deceptive as it indicates a direct quote from Brzezinski that the journalist has since conceded was “invented” by the editorial staff, which casts doubt on the subsequent text.
@JustinVaisse Ultimately, if this one problematic interview is discounted there is very little other legitimate evidence to back up the “Afghan trap” thesis.
