Thread by @Charles_Lister

Amusing & sad seeing some analysts continue to naively read shady & complex developments through a strictly black/white lens - as if things in the world of jihadism occur along slick, clean lines.

It only shows your analytical immaturity.

Look deeper. #Syria

Jabhat al-Nusra (pre-#JFS) was a movement of several ‘wings.’

When Nusra leader #Jolani was presented w. an ultimatum in mid-July 2016 (break from AQ or face 30%+ defection), there then began a furious debate throughout #Nusra’s command structure about the group’s future.

1/10

Within #Nusra’s Shura Council, the subject of moving away from AQ was almost 50:50 - with several of the group’s most senior leaders insisting *no.*

As the debate bled down through Nusra’s regional commands, differing proposals gained weight - like 'Chinese Whispers.'

2/10

For simplicity’s sake, the debate (which lasted only days) created 3 camps:

1) “No, this is illegitimate"

2) “Yes, but maintain ambiguity”

3) “Yes, this is in our best interests”

- As pressure rose to make a decision, 2 & 3 combined for a majority “Yes” vote - for #JFS.

3/10

The context here is crucial:

#Jolani *had* to make a decision - vis-a-vis internal (Nusra) & external (#Syria opposition) dynamics. The rush to conclude made for particularly ambiguous terms for moving ahead w. #JFS. As x1 Nusra official told me:

- “We just had to do it.”

4/10

So did some potential detractors (Camp 1-2) believe #JFS’s formation came with intentional ambiguity? Definitely.

But did other senior leaders believe a ‘break’ was being made? Absolutely.

And did some other senior leaders (Camp 1) vote No & leave #JFS altogether? Yes.

5/10

How do we know all of this? Not from “rebel gossip,” no.

All this has been widely discussed in public by those involved (directly & as ultimatum facilitators). And some have also secondarily verified it privately, with those involved (until this day).

#Nusra #JFS #Syria

6/10

The situation gained further complexity when:

1) AQ Deputy Abu al-Khayr changed his mind (from Yes, to No) after consultation w. other AQ Deputies in Af-Pak/#Iran.

2) #JFS evolved into #HTS, further diluting AQ’s role & de facto “breaking” ties in most people’s minds.

7/10

Since #HTS’s formation, the situation has devolved into a bitter dispute focused on thorny issues of credibility & legitimacy.

Everything read in this context should be assessed within a dynamic of defensiveness, in which all are making assertions with self-seeking intent.

8/10

Oraydi, Maqdisi & co. have thrown themselves overwhelmingly on one side of the debate. Why? It’s easy to do re. credibility.

Faced by a united front of criticism by respected veteran jihadis, some (like Attoun) have stressed Nusra's middle-ground intent (Camp 2 vision).

9/10

It should also go without saying that Attoun is *well known* to be:

(1) #Jolani’s most loyal defender (many say far too much so)

(2) Someone for whom the whole truth is rarely seen as a necessity (he has effectively been disowned by his pro-jihadi father for this).

10/10

Therefore:

(1) To focus *solely* on recent testimony produced in this specific environment is somewhat questionable.

(2) To insist on viewing the #Nusra-#JFS evolution as a simple, black/white development is just naive.

These were messy, chaotic changes 18 months ago.

11/11