Thread by @RJBrodsky

Israel’s Operation #NorthernShield, which recently exposed #Hezbollah’s cross-border attack tunnels, has prompted the perennial question: Are #Israel and #Hezbollah about to go to war in #Lebanon? I explore it in this @AlArabiya_Eng⁩ article & below 👇🏼 english.alarabiya.net/en/features/20…

The tunnels #Hezbollah burrowed are meant to facilitate the movement and infiltration into northern #Israel of hundreds of its fighters as part of its well-established military doctrine that calls for “the conquest of the Galilee.” jcpa.org/article/hizbul…

Tunnels aren't the main threat #Israel faces from #Lebanon. Before making #NorthernShield public @netanyahu met @SecPompeo to pass a msg to the Lebanese authorities: Stop #Hezbollah’s efforts to acquire to precision-guided missiles or Israel will act. jpost.com/Israel-News/Ne…

Equally troubling from #Israel’s perspective is the uptick in direct flights from #Tehran to #Beirut using civilian airliners that carry advanced weaponry such as GPS components that could upgrade #Hezbollah’s arsenal of unguided heavy rockets & missiles. foxnews.com/world/iran-sen…

Despite hundreds of #Israel strikes in #Syria, #Iran has already secured many of its war-related objectives, however, it has been less successful transferring PGMs and other “game-changing” weapons to #Hezbollah in #Lebanon. timesofisrael.com/idf-says-it-ha…

#Israel’s success in interdicting these weapon transfers in #Syria explains in part why #Iran is shifting its advanced weapons production program to #Lebanon, which constitutes a serious breach of Israel’s clearly articulated red lines.

#Israel is mindful of the Iranian shift in tactics. The IDF has long publicized #Hezbollah’s violations of UNSCR 1701, and the legacy of abject failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Lebanese government. idf.il/en/minisites/h…

Other examples include: March 2017, the Kuwaiti daily, al-Jarida, reported that #Iran established missile manufacturing facilities in #Lebanon more than 50 meters underground. memri.org/reports/kuwait…

A few months later, #Israel’s director of militarily intelligence, Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi, publicly confirmed that the #Iran’s #IRGC had established several weapons factories in #Lebanon. haaretz.com/israel-news/he…

In Jan 2018, IDF Spox Ronen Manelis published an Arabic article in Lebanese & Arab media outlets warning that #Iran was using #Lebanon as a “pawn” and that it had “opened a new branch” in Lebanon, turning the country “into one large missile factory.” ynetnews.com/articles/0,734…

It appears to mirror #Israel’s public diplomacy strategy in #Syria where #Iran establishes military bases & infrastructure, @ImageSatIntl would release satellite images in Western media, and shortly thereafter an Israeli strike would hit the location. 🤷🏻‍♂️ bbc.com/news/world-mid…

The Iranian base at al-Kiswah just south of #Damascus, or #Iran's military post, surface-to-surface missile storage & manufacturing sites, and Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center that are all located near #Masyaf, are just a few recent examples. ynetnews.com/articles/0,734…

#Israel refers to the current phase as the campaign between wars. “If you are successful in the interim campaign, then you can prevent the next war or expand the period of time between two wars. It will also make the next war less costly to fight when it happens,” -@yossikup

The question #Israel must often ask and answer is if it is willing to stick to the current paradigm of the campaign between wars, which continues to kick the proverbial can down the road, in order to maintain some semblance of a favorable status quo?

How would #Iran and #Hezbollah respond if #Israel strikes in #Lebanon and it causes little collateral damage? Would Iran risk the defeat of Hezbollah, the devastation of Lebanon, & the diminishment its own regional position over the loss of a couple manufacturing sites & tunnels?

On one hand, #Iran has so far shown an unwillingness to confront #Israel militarily if it requires sustained conventional warfare. Hundreds of successful Israeli airstrikes on Iranian assets in #Syria testify to this reluctance. timesofisrael.com/idf-says-it-ha…

On the other hand, the regime in Tehran has demonstrated it is willing to fight to the last Lebanese in #Lebanon, and the last Syrian, Iraqi, Afghani, & Pakistani in #Syria. And they are willing to sacrifice the well-being of their own people in pursuit of foreign adventures.

For more on #Iran's economic turmoil even as the regime pumps billions of $$$ into it's foreign adventures, read this @AlArabiya_Eng article from @HeshmatAlavi and follow him on Twitter: english.alarabiya.net/en/features/20…

Short of a direct Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, it’s hard to imagine that the regime in #Iran would seek to escalate to a full-scale war with #Israel. Moreover, would the Iranian regime see it as worth the risk before developing a nuclear deterrent?

#Israel may conclude that limited strikes in #Lebanon could be the answer to shift the rules of the game back in its favor, if it is prepared to counter a limited retaliation. It entails significant risk & hinges on #Iran's understanding that the 2006 rules no longer apply.

In 2006, #Israel fought the war with #Hezbollah in #Lebanon only, even though it saw the #Assad regime in #Syria transferring weapons off of its own shelves. But the conflict wasn't widened to include Syria.

That is to say that #Israel’s answer to a major counter-attack from #Hezbollah in #Lebanon (missiles on Tel Aviv, etc) could have a new address, which happens to be the center of gravity and point of origin for many of the region’s problems. That address, of course, is in #Iran.