THREAD: For years, the Kremlin's been embracing populists & nationalists across Europe & U.S. Yet how have things played out for some of its closest allies in Italy/Austria? Not quite like Moscow hoped, according to the newest installment of Carnegie’s #GlobalRussia project 1/
The #GlobalRussia project has focused on Russia’s growing assertiveness in regions the Kremlin largely neglected after the Cold War—eg the Middle East, NE Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Europe is another story: it has always been too important for the Kremlin to ignore. 2/ 
Moscow has trouble distinguishing Europe from the threat posed by the US which is why it looks for ways to plant wedges. Post-2014 realities (sanctions, diplomatic isolation, NATO deterrence moves) have encouraged Moscow to meddle more blatantly in European domestic politics 3/
The fact European populists treated Putin like a poster child for his self-avowed (albeit insincere) conservative values and critique of a decadent, declining West created a slew of new buddies. First and foremost, Moscow wanted to puncture EU unity over its war in #Ukraine. 4/
In 2014-2016, marginal parties like Italy’s Northern League (Lega), Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO), & France’s Front National (FN) got face time w Putin & other politicians, photo ops in Crimea and Donbas, funding (FN), agreements with the ruling United Russia party (Lega/FPO) 5/
Then things got really interesting. The migration crisis and resulting populist wave across Europe led to coalition governments in both Italy and Austria in 2018. But how much of their pro-Russia posturing translated into major policy changes? Surprisingly little. 6/
Salvini promised at his first cabinet meeting that he'd torpedo the sanctions regime. But it soon became clear Italy could take such a precipitous action exactly once—and then face severe consequences from Brussels/Berlin. In the end, neither Italy nor Austria lifted a finger. 7/
The reality: Lega was pandering to its electoral base. And cozy, financially lucrative ties between Moscow and Italian/Austrian elites are nothing new (indeed, they flourished during the Cold War and afterwards). Both countries remained firmly planted in Western structures. 8/
Both Lega and FPO became embroiled in Russia-related corruption scandals. Both coalition governments crashed and burned in the 2nd half of 2019. Yet Salvini remains Italy’s most popular politician & his possible return to power hovers over a fragile governing coalition. 9/
What does this story tell us about Russia's hold over its populist allies and tactics in Europe? For one thing, most Italians (both elites and general public) hold positive views on Russia so the Kremlin has no need to go to great lengths to push narratives or disinformation. 10/
Why spend money or take big risks (say, with information operations) when the Kremlin can receive much of what it wants from Italy for free? 11/
In the end, it is telling that the Kremlin during this period chose to prioritize pomp and circumstance (and some clever forms of trolling👇) not major policy initiatives w Austria or Italy. Nor did it seek to expand economic cooperation, given all of the post-2014 headwinds. 12/
Russia’s relationships with Italy/Austria can & will create challenges for Washington, especially in a newly proclaimed era of great power competition. Neither country will see eye to eye with the US on how to deal with Russia. Moscow will be happy to exploit any differences. 12/
But understanding Moscow’s wants, its ability to appeal to Rome and Vienna, and the limits of Russian influence can help Washington deal with differences in a measured, strategic way. Our full research paper and short video clip are available here: carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/27/wit… END
