“The maritime #history of #China has long been a neglected field..China Goes to Sea bring[s] that knowledge-gap to an end..will be an indispensable companion to those readers seeking to understand where China’s navy may be heading.”
As European #naval powers & even the @USNavy struggle with ship numbers, #China has gone to #sea.
Represents the reversal of a great historical trend that began 600 years ago, when China withdrew from the seas & European naval expansion spread Western influence around the globe.
For the first time in #Chinese#history, #China’s status & identity as a maritime (vs. continental) power is a robust, enduring question—
to what extent will China’s persisting political & strategic geography & the continentalist strategic culture it helped form shape it at sea?
We probe several cases of attempted transformation in the ancient world that may elucidate #China’s #maritime prospects.
Together with #Roman Empire, the #Persian Empire is the most successful example we examined.
New ideas, incentives, & scale yielded first substantial #navy.
#Sparta offers one of the most dramatic examples of fast #maritime transformation failure.
An austere, inward-looking, arrogant, conservative, continental power, its feudal agricultural system did not produce significant surplus.
During #PaxRomana, #maritime commerce flourished throughout Med—the ancient equivalent of an era of globalization under protection of a great power naval policing force.
The #Ottoman Empire had significant resources but also what proved to be insuperable continentalist limitations.
Land frontiers diverted attention & resources.
Ottomans were thus unable to keep up w/ economic globalization & forfeited their chance to dominate 1st global market.
As the center of #naval competition moved into the Atlantic & beyond during the modern era, several of the major continental powers made earnest attempts at #maritime transformation—with limited success.
Imperial #France made 4 major attempts, & failed each time to sustain them.
"Prohibitions" drove #Chinese/foreign merchants into coastal #piracy, which flourished during #Wokou Raids of 1540s–80s. (#map)
#Qing#China first focused on stabilizing its North/West land frontiers.
Initially conquered vast new territories on Inner Asian periphery.
Generals Li & Zuo debated the geostrategic prioritization of #land vs #sea power.
Qing chose land power. Li & China suffered the results.
Beyond internal political problems, #Qing#China suffered severely from rising British, French & Japanese #naval power.
Proved incapable of resisting Western pwrs' modern navies. (#map)
Ceded #HongKong after Britain penetrated heart of China's riverine network in 1st #OpiumWar.
#Qing#China eventually purchased #ships from abroad—but lacked reliable infrastructure & professional #navy to operate them effectively in battle.
Disastrous results. Suffered costly defeat in 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War. (#map)
Qing fell in 1911—then years of chaos & Civil War.
During #ColdWar, #China’s #naval development was constrained—first by US dominance of #maritime#EastAsia & later by internal policy debacles & deterioration of relations with the USSR.
China has overcome historical obstacles to achieve what may finally be enduring maritime development.
Dynamic commercial maritime sector & #CivMil#shipbuilding synergy offers a strong basis for transformation typically lacking in land powers that earlier attempted to go to sea.
#PRC/#CCTV#大国崛起 9-#GreatPower#history emphasizes importance of internal unity, market mechanisms, related ideological/scientific/institutional innovation, & int'l peace.
Suggests power stems from economic dev't fueled by foreign trade—itself underwritten by a strong #navy.
What are #history's lessons from continental/land powers attempting #maritime transformation?
And what are #China's own trajectory & prospects in this regard?
Some concluding thoughts from #China Goes to #Sea...
The extent to which #PRC should attempt such a transformation has been & will be debated.
#China enjoys advantages that its predecessors have generally lacked:
1) Robust maritime economy 2) Dynamic shipbuilding industry 3) Settled borders w/ nearly all land neighbors 4) Leadership that supports maritime development as natural phenomenon—doesn't "decree" unduly [...?]
In conclusion:
#China has very likely turned the corner on a genuine #maritime transformation.
Such an achievement would be a remarkable—if not singular—event in the #history of the last two millennia.
#PRC "gov't, which has built an extensive digital infrastructure & security apparatus to ctrl dissent on its own platforms, is going to even greater lengths to extend its internet dragnet to unmask & silence those who criticize"
These new investigations, targeting sites blocked inside #China, are relying on sophisticated technological methods to expand the reach of #Chinese authorities & the list of targets"
News Channels/China Military News
Maritime militia increases drills, expands in scope
Source: China Daily Editor: Yao Jianing
2016-02-02 17:16
But don't take my word for it, read #ChinaDaily:
"As the People's Liberation Army upgrades its navy, commissioning dozens of new ships under a watchful global eye,a less noticed force,China's maritime militia, is also improving its operational capability." english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/…
"The greatest danger for the United States in this competition is the erosion of conventional deterrence..Absent a convincing deterrent, the [PRC] will be emboldened to take action to undermine the rules-based international order"
"In September 2020, #Cambodia razed a #US-built facility on #Ream Naval Base that served as the headquarters for the National Committee on Maritime Security, reportedly in order to make way for a #PRC#naval#base."