Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #BverfG

Most recents (18)

#BVerfG DILEMMA❓
Die wichtigsten & nachvollziehbaren Argumente (FAZ Artikel) im Thread zusammengefasst, die #EZB habe es richtig gemacht❗️
faz.net/aktuell/finanz…

Es fehlt mE ein Punkt im Diskurs, die EZB Geldpolitik muss auch eine Vollbeschäftigung in Europa fördern. [f.]

1/7
Und dieses wichtige zusätzliche Ziel konnte nur durch #EZB's #Niedrigzins-Politik erreicht werden❗️

FAZ ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
🔹Zinsen & Renditen in D. sind weit niedriger als in fast allen anderen #Euro-Ländern.
🔹Das hat nichts mit der gemeinsamen Geldpolitik der #EZB zu tun.
2/7
🔹Stattdessen ist bei uns der Kapitalbedarf des Staates zum Glück weit geringer als nahezu überall sonst.
🔹 Dank der #SchwarzeNull können wir aus einer Position der Stärke heraus die #Pandemie-Kosten schultern❗️
🔹 Nach der Logik der Karlsruher Einwände gg die Politik [f.]
3/7
Read 8 tweets
Tracing the mastermind behind #BVerfG judgment isn't easy. But the judgment draws & quotes heavily from a thoughtful article by Mark Dawson&Ana Bobic @thehertieschool published 2019 in CMLReview

Their criticism became punchline of the #BVerfG ruling against #ECB & #ECJ. Thread
First, Dawson/Bobic criticized that #ECJ already in its #OMT judgment had poorly assessed the evidence provided by #ECB to support OMT

Just as #BVerfG had previously criticized OMT & now argues that ECJ assessment of #PSPP is methodologically flawed (para. 137 of judgment)
...then they point at poor #ECJ analysis of possible alternatives to #PSPP. ECJ should have checked for measures with less burdensome economic side-effects.  

#BVerfG picked up this point in paras 139ff arguing that ECJ unproportionality test is insufficient
Read 7 tweets
Devastating, incredibly prophetic quotes from the dissenting opinion in the #GCC 2014 ruling on #OMT (in German).

tldr in English: do *not* fall for the line that the German constitution obliged the #BVerfG to rule as it did.

1/4
Rather there has been a persistent effort over an extended to open up the legal space to make the recent ruling possible.

Let me unoffically translate one long sentence (written, to repeat, in 2014) which encapsulates what is problematic about last week's ruling:

2/4
"That a few independent German judges, basing themselves on the German interpretation of the democracy principle and on the limits this and our interpretation of A123ff TFEU set on the legitimate powers of the independent ECB, take a decision with incalculably far-reaching...
3/4
Read 4 tweets
After some time away from research due to reasons and stuff, time to get back to my book-proposal. Given recent developments, I thought I'd share some thoughts on what I do.

Put simply, my research concerns the question why there is so much law in EMU. A (long) thread/
The recent judgement by the #BVerfG on the ECB is only the latest instalment of the controversial role of law for the euro. However, there is no proper account of what law exactly does for the euro, why it is so prominent, and lastly, what we may expect from law (and Courts). /2
I argue that we should pay attention to the legal form of the rules of the euro, namely their basis in the EU Treaties. This greatly affects what was expected of the law, how the rules were made and how they can be changed. I call this the constitutionalization of the euro. /3
Read 18 tweets
Emboldened by the German Constitutional Court #BVerfG decision on @ecb QE, several other national Const. Courts are about to issue their own rulings. The Centre for the Law in Central Banking (CLiC) has helpfully collected them in its WP 69/2020. Long thread. First, Portugal 1/n
The Tribunal Constitucional of PT has argued that @ecb incorrectly gave precedence to issue limit over capital key, therefore all but stopping the purchase of PT bonds. However, unlike GCC, it recognizes it has no jurisdiction over ECB and it has ordered 2/n
...the Portuguese Government to issue more new debt so that @ecb can make up the difference. The Government has answered that it should not be a problem, considering the massive deficit coming because of COVID-19. Next, Estonia 3/n
Read 10 tweets
The governments of Poland and Hungary are deliberately misrepresenting the German Constitutional Court’s judgement on the ECB to bolster their attacks on the EU’s legal order.

Rather than repeat their propaganda, it is important to understand why it’s misleading. THREAD
1/ HU and PL are asserting that it shows that member states can individually decide the applicability of EU law on the grounds that member state constitutional law is superior to EU law (even if EU law is superior to ordinary national legislation)
2/ This is of course not what actually happens. The way the #BVerfG understands the situation rather is through the conferral of competences.
Read 17 tweets
Some commentators of today's #BVerfG decision argue that it shows an #ordoliberal bias. Here are some first thoughts about this 1/
From a certain perspective, the #BVerfG decision ticks some key ordoliberal boxes: a) purporting to maintain a constitutional order that limits discretionary economic policy; 2/
b) advising the ECB to remain within its mandate, i.e. a rules-based approach; c) by forcing the ECB to consider the wider economic effects of #PPSP, it is signalling concern about potential “market-distorting” consequences 3/
Read 23 tweets
Poland's Deputy Justice Minister @sjkaleta on #BVerfG: "Member states are the masters of the EU Treaties, this is what the German Federal Constitutional Court said today. Germans defend their sovereignty. The EU says only as much as we, the members states, allow it."
/2 Member states won't allow the ECB to act as it did. This is why the German court ruled that the principle of proportionality has been breached [by the ECB]. This is of tremendous importance to the dispute about the rule of law in Poland.
/3 Recently, the Polish Constitutional Court handed some rulings. Afterwards, the spokesperson of the European Commission and some EU commissioners had the audacity to lecture us that the EU law is above the Polish law, above the Polish Constitution.
Read 4 tweets
Is the #BVerfG verdict really that bad? Can’t the #ECB just write a letter explaining why PSPP is proportional and thus legal under German constitution? /thread
Well, yes it can. And it will, I am sure. No reason to stonewall the Court at this point. But the problem is: the #BVerfG has already set quite a few limits on what it considers proportional. /2
The main criticism is that neither the #ECB nor the ECJ did a proper analysis (or at least not use that analysis) on the economic policy implications of the PSPP. The verdict reads quite harsh on that omission, esp re: the ECJ. /3
Read 10 tweets
BVerfG-EZB-Anleihekäufe: Die erste Ultra-vires-Feststellung durch das BVerfG gibt sicher eine schöne Gelegenheit, die Grundpositionen zum Verhältnis zwischen Unionsrecht und Verfassungsrecht zu besichtigen.

(Thread.)

1/
Das Spektrum dürfte in etwa von @prof_mayer (mit der Forderung, ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Deutschland einzuleiten) ...

2/ Image
... bis zu @FrankSchorkopf reichen (ein "großes, vielleicht historisches Urteil")...

Mal schauen, ob es auch Stimmen zwischen diesen Polen gibt...?

3/ Image
Read 50 tweets
The German Constitutional Court ruling (#BVerfG). Summary thread.

1) The main implication is not at the surface. ECB can continue quantitative easing and Bundesbank will in all likelihood continue to participate. What has changed today is the independence of the ECB.

1/8
2) The BVerfG raises the question of the limits of ECB independence. This is big. They insist that the ECB independence ends when the ECB starts to get into "economic policy" as opposed to "monetary policy".

2/8
3) The problem is that the border between monetary policy and its economic implications can't be defined. The BVerfG looks economically naïve here. But I think this is deliberate - and almost vicious: BVerfG wants to keep discretion to decide on this border all by itself.

3/8
Read 8 tweets
A short #thread on the #Karlsruhe decision on the legality of the @ecb's #QE #PSPP ... (NOT #PEPP or #Covid QE)

My overall assessment ...

It's not good ... 3 or 4 /10 where 10/10 would have been carte blanche for the #ECB and 0/0 "QE is verboten", a disaster for the #Eurozone
First the headline bombshell "ECB decisions on the Public Sector Purchase Programme exceed EU competences" is a BIG deal ... the @BVerfG has directly accused the @ecb of violating the #EU constitution and the @EUCourtPress and #German government of complicity in this violation!
More precisely, #BverfG says the #ECB violated Art 5(1) and 5(4) on "#proportionality" by failing to demonstrate that it considered the "economic effects" of #QE before launching it, and that #Germany and the #ECJ failed to hold the Governing Council of the #ECB to this standard!
Read 9 tweets
Germany’s top judges may be presenting us with the intriguing case of a safe asset (German bunds) that suddenly looses central bank support.
No dull crisis in Eurozone. ft.com/content/bfe02c… via @financialtimes
equally shocking, there are 1750 German economists (and some lawyers) who either
1. havent read monetary theory in a good while.
2. have read monetary theory and are playing political games.
if 1, that Milton Friedman bible needs to be closed.
Milton's disciples! start with @BCoeure speech on sovereign debt. That complicates a bit the 'monetary financing is evil' mantra, but hey, you can handle complexity (even when delivered by a French).
ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date…
Read 23 tweets
Useful thread with links on the upcoming ruling by the German Constitutional Court #BVerfG.
What is not sufficently emphasised imho is the risk to the entire legal framework of the EU. It's not just a matter of EMU. The primacy and thus the consistency of EU law is at stake.
1
If countries can subvert agreed EU procedures and institutions, on which the highest EU court, the ECJ, has made a ruling, using national (constitutional) courts, & deriving a legitimacy from their own national constitutions, we are on a slippery slope indeed.
2
Update based on first report of the decision (spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ezb…)
We are indeed on a slippery slope. Let us be clear: The GCC (a majority of 7:1 judges) is of the opinion that the ECJ has made an error in interpreting EU law. This is not just a technical mon pol issue.
Read 13 tweets
1/ Tuesday 6 May 10:00 the German constitutional court (#BVerfG) issues ruling on the #ECB’s quantitative easing, the Public Sector Purchase Programme (#PSPP). Here is a short thread on possible rulings and how likely they are:
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Ter…
2/ What is it about? First, there are doubts about the compatibility of the PSPP with the prohibition of monetary financing according to Art. 123(1) TFEU
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex…
3/ Second, the ECB might have overstepped its mandate. According to principle of conferral (Art. 5 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU, in conjunction with Arts. 119, 127 et seq. TFEU), the ECB shall act only within the limits of the competences ...
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex…
Read 22 tweets
1/x Geht ja schon mal gut los: @EU_EDPB erkennt richtig, dass Rechtsgrundlage eines #Delisting nicht allein Art. 17 #DSGVO (Recht auf #Löschung), sondern auch Art. 21 DSGVO (Recht auf #Widerspruch) sein kann (muss?).
@EU_EDPB 2/x Dann wird leider die Auffassung der Art. 29-Gruppe wiederholt, wonach der Suchmaschinenbetreiber den first publisher nicht über einen Antrag auf Delisting informieren darf.
Read 18 tweets
1/x Thread zur totalen Drittwirkung des Grundrechts auf #Datenschutz:

U.a. @AlexAmtmann u @PhilippQuiel diskutieren, ob die #EU überhaupt die Gesetzgebungskompetenz für den Erlass der #DSGVO hat. Ein Nebenkriegsschauplatz ist die Frage, ob inwieweit Art. 8 #Grundrechtecharta ...
2/x
... mittelbare Drittwirkung zwischen Privaten entfalten kann/darf, obwohl Art. 51 I 1 GRCh ja ausdrücklich nur für das Handeln der EU-Organe u das der Mitgliedstaaten gilt.

Meine These lautet: die DSGVO führt faktisch zu einer totalen Drittwirkung des Datenschutzgrundrechts
3/x
Sobald der Bürger pbD verarbeitet, treffen ihn aufgrund der #DSGVO Pflichten, die sonst nur der Gesetzgeber hat. Diese Pflichten könnte man staatsähnliche Pflichten nennen.

Vergleichen wir die Pflichten des Gesetzgebers mit denen des privaten Datenverarbeiters:
Read 25 tweets
[Thread
aus Anlass von #bz0802]

Schon die Veranstaltungen in der #Kreuzkirche #Dresden 2016 haben eindeutig belegt, dass große Podiumsveranstaltungen NICHT das Format sind, die zum Zusammenhalt einer zuvor bereits deutlich polarisierten Stadtgesellschaft beitragen können.
1/25
Diese großen Veranstaltungen tragen eher zur weiteren Polarisierung bei.

Problem ist nicht, dass wir unterschiedliche "Fakten" in unterschiedlicher Weise in Debatten einbringen, ..
2/25
... sondern dass sich
die Denk-Muster,
die Kategorien,
in denen wir Ereignisse, Entwicklungen, Erfahrungen, Nachrichten, "Fakten" einordnen, mitunter fundamental unterscheiden.
3/25
Read 26 tweets

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